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ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY

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With a foreword by
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FOREWORD

THE editors of the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* have published the following pages in the May number as a result of the interest of the Canadian Political Science Association in the development of sociology, and I have been asked by them to thank the contributors. I should like to thank them also on behalf of the Department of Social Science and of the Course in Sociology in the Department of Political Economy of the University of Toronto for their contributions to the advancement of an interest in sociology, since four of the papers were presented as part of a series of lectures under joint auspices on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Department of Social Science.

The position of sociology in associations of the social sciences and in universities suggests the established vested interests of older disciplines. The study of law has been fostered by a profession, and within a university it has supported the development of the social sciences and has been strengthened by them, but philosophy has provided the matrix from which the specialized disciplines have emerged. John Stuart Mill defined political economy as "a branch of social philosophy so interlinked with all the other branches that its conclusions, even in its own peculiar province, are only true conditionally subject to interference and counteraction from causes not directly within its scope; while to the character of practical guide it has no pretension apart from other classes of consideration." Its implicit inadequacies were accompanied by a tolerance which encouraged the growth of other disciplines.

Political science was linked in its theoretical aspects to problems of the state and in its practical aspects to the study of administration and government. It has been endangered by the aridity of details. History has been largely concerned with church and state, and the organization of associations and institutions concerned with its study reflect the importance of hierarchies. The organization of disciplines in the social sciences illustrates in varying degrees the statement of Paul-Louis Courier: "In bodies of talent, no distinction, except that of talent, gives offense." Each discipline becomes entrenched behind the organization which reflects its peculiarities. Graduates trained in one discipline encourage other students, including their children, to pursue that discipline very often in the

same university. Large numbers of students facilitate the appointment of additional instructors since administrative policy recognizes the relation between students, fees, and revenue. The instructors are all too often graduates of the same institution. A brave university president faces the problem and makes appointments in a new discipline. The new appointments become aggressive solicitors for students in order to make additional appointments to attract more students. Frictions¹ with older departments are apt to develop until a new position of equilibrium is established. New subjects are hampered by a proselytizing zeal reflected in lower teaching standards and an insatiable interest in enrolment. Old subjects suffer by anticipating and opposing new subjects and their development. The period of forays, attacks, and counter-attacks add little to the prestige of a university.

The development of sociology as a discipline offers promise not only as a corrective to the biases of organization in special disciplines in providing a sociology of the social sciences but also in contributing

¹I find it difficult to conceive what useful purposes the formal definition of the scope of a discipline can serve, except the purposes of editors of encyclopedias and administrators of educational institutions, whose responsibility it may be to prevent overlapping, to obtain full coverage, and to arbitrate jurisdictional disputes. No damage is likely to be incurred by economics if serious consideration of these jurisdictional questions is confined to those for whom it is an unavoidable occupational responsibility.

It is indeed arguable that energy spent in trying to define the proper limits of disciplines is often worse than energy wasted, since preoccupation with such definition often arises from an inadequately suppressed desire to confine analysis to one's own private set of assumptions and concepts. In the absence of precise delimitation of the scope of a field there will, it is true, tend to be much overlapping and much raggedness of boundaries. Overlapping, however, is, outside of encyclopedias with crowded pages and the curricula of universities with strained budgets, an evil of a minor order. The waste of effort which may result from it is more than counterbalanced by the mutual stimulation of the overlapping disciplines which it tends to provide, and by the safeguards which it sets up against degeneration of the individual disciplines into formal and lifeless academic systems whose original organs of contact with the problems of real life and with the development of thought in other fields have become atrophied through more or less deliberate disuse. The opposite evil, too restricted a scope, with consequent neglect of promising areas of investigation, is a more genuine one, and definition may conceivably serve to expose its existence and to indicate its specific nature, but a sample demonstration of how the discipline would be improved by an extension of its scope would seem to be a much more effective means of securing such extension. (Jacob Viner, *Studies in the Theory of International Trade*, New York, 1937, pp. 594-5.)

to a more effective attack on the problems of the whole field. The increasing complexity of modern civilization has involved increasing specialization in the social sciences. Political economy beginning with Adam Smith has assumed a broad knowledge of political science and sociology, but the increasing obsession of the subject with problems of prices has narrowed its contributions and has increased the importance of the study of political science² and sociology. The outbreak of a major war has emphasized the limitations of established disciplines. Economics and political science have apparently little to offer in the study of nationalism,³ whereas sociology has been suggestive. Sociology emerges, therefore, with the advantage of a widening field and an increasing realization on the part of other social sciences of its importance.

On the other hand, its youth involves disadvantages. Those concerned with its advancement bring in a quantity of baggage from other disciplines in which they have been trained and become involved in arguments as to methods and content. A great obstacle to sociology is the sociologist, and his persistence as a political scientist, economist, anthropologist, or whatever he may have been in "pure" sociology. The subject is littered with work reflecting narrow specialisms. Its limitations in narrow fields are accompanied by the defects of attempts at inclusiveness. As with other new subjects, its exponents stress its "co-ordinating" tendencies; an indication that it is concerned with everything and with nothing. The development of a systematized body of knowledge into a discipline, which is the prevailing trend of the social sciences, involves sociology as well as other subjects, but the propensity to co-ordinate dies hard and is carried forward successively by younger disciplines. Adam Smith stressed the place of the individual and laid the basis for a synthesis of the social sciences. Aberrations were evident in Ricardo and, in turn, in Marx, though the latter drew support from Hegel as did also List with his emphasis on nationalism. Increasing attention to the study of society and of institutions, especially the family, was strengthened by an interest in evolution

²See C. B. Macpherson, "On the Study of Politics in Canada" (*Essays in Political Economy in Honour of E. J. Urwick*, ed. H. A. Innis, Toronto, 1938).

³"A belief in the economic causes of war is the greatest obstacle to any intelligent and effective control of war because it means the abdication of human reason in favor of blind and inescapable power" (M. Handmann, "War, Economic Motives, and Economic Symbols" (*American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1939, p. 648).

under the stimulus of Darwin. Specialization was hastened in the study of regions under human geography, of civilization under anthropology⁴ and its various branches, and history, of institutions under law and political science, of functions under economics, of individuals under psychology, but attempts have been made to provide a synthesis by Toynbee, Sorokin, and others.

The ambitious character of attempts to synthesize knowledge in the social sciences reflects their limitations. Philosophy, the basis of the social sciences, is killed, stuffed, and properly labelled. Neither sociology nor any other discipline can offer a substitute. Exponents of the individual disciplines of the social sciences, including philosophy, one by one, wash their hands of the problem of philosophy⁵ or offer spurious remedies and alternatives. It is a pleasure to refer to the efforts of Professor MacIver, Professor Urwick,⁶ and others to maintain an interest in the fundamental problems of civilization. It is this which offers hope of life in each of the social sciences. In a new country such as Canada the influence of established disciplines in Great Britain and the United States hampers the possibility of philosophical interest. Moreover, the exacting demands of the study of social sciences in Canada range from a detailed knowledge of industrial technology to that of ecclesiastical hierarchies. But the development of sociology in relation to particular problems will provide stimulus to the older disciplines and an appreciation of their limitations. From such an appreciation, philosophy may flourish.

H. A. I.

⁴See C. W. M. Hart, "Social Evolution and Modern Anthropology" (*Essays in Political Economy in Honour of E. J. Urwick*).

⁵See F. H. Knight, "Ethics and Economic Reform" (*Economica*, Feb., Aug., Nov., 1939).

⁶See E. J. Urwick, "Social Philosophy and Social Work" (*Training for Social Work, 1914-1940*, Toronto, 1940); see also Professor Park's lecture in this volume.

PHYSICS AND SOCIETY

SOME seventy years ago, sixty-eight, to be exact, Walter Bagehot published a notable little volume entitled *Physics and Politics*, described in a subtitle as "Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of 'Natural Selection' and 'Inheritance' to Political Society." Actually the volume sought to sketch in outline a natural history of political society, and to describe the process or processes by which later, more elaborate, and more liberal forms of association have emerged from the dissolution of earlier, simpler, and more rigid, if not oppressive, forms.

Society, or at least political society, as Bagehot conceived it, is a kind of super-organism, having a social structure which is maintained by a social process. This structure is imbedded in and cemented by custom. Man is a custom-making animal. The process in this instance which is not otherwise defined, is what we know elsewhere as "the historical process." Its function is to weave and reweave the web of custom and tradition in which the individuals who are destined to live together and eventually act together as a political unit, are ineluctably bound together.

Always there is a more or less inflexible tradition which imposes upon each new generation the pattern of the inherited social order. But always there are the liberating and individuating influences of other social processes—competition, conflict, and discussion—which represent what Bagehot describes as man's "propensity to variation," or, to use a political rather than a biological term, his propensity for non-conformity, "which," he adds, "is the principle of progress."

Competition, not economic merely but biotic, the kind of competition which, according to Darwin, was responsible for the different organic species, as well as the different races of man, seems to have been the individuating and organizing factor in what Bagehot describes as "the preliminary age," at a time when society, in the human sense of that term, was no more than emergent. The preliminary age in which man lived in a social order, familial and genetic rather than political, but at any rate irresistibly fixed in custom and tradition, was eventually succeeded by the "age of conflict."

War and conquest, even when they involved slavery, seem to have been the first great emancipators of man, since they first effectively destroyed the fixed customary social order in which man had lived until that time as a mental prisoner of his tribal or local culture.¹ It

¹Slavery, because it is one of the institutions to which, "at a certain stage of growth all nations in all countries cleave to," is described by Bagehot as "a provisional institution." In accordance with this conception "a slave is an unassimilated atom; something which is in the body politic, but yet hardly part of it." *Physics and Politics* (London, 1872), p. 171.

was in conquest that the state, which first brought together in a common *modus vivendi* peoples of different races and cultures, seems to have had its origin.² But if the state had its origin in war it nevertheless imposed peace within the territory that it dominated. It is this fact, perhaps, that justifies the statement that "the function of war has been to extend the area within which it has been possible to maintain peace," and with peace, industry, commerce, and a wider division of labour.

With the rise of industry and of commerce, an "age of discussion" gradually superseded, at least in the Western world, the age of conflict. It was, in fact, about the market-place, where men came together to dicker and chaffer, to exchange goods and ideas, that political discussion grew up and intellectual life began. It was, as Bagehot remarks, "politics and discussion that finally broke all the bonds of custom" which, up to that time, had strangled men's thinking and held them in bondage to precedent and to the past.

The age of discussion is obviously also the age of reason. Reason is, in fact, the product of dialectic, just as mind, according to Mead, is the product of social interaction. "We must regard mind, then, as arising and developing within the social process, within the empirical matrix of social interactions."³ In this age of discussion, then, men are no longer trammelled by either tradition or custom, but are free to discuss everything in the heavens or under the seas; everything, accordingly, sacred or secular is now, or in a way to be, the subject of rational analysis or scientific inquiry. Thoughts are never dangerous, it seems, as long as discussion is possible.

One should add, perhaps, that although in this new, enlightened world man is no longer hampered by piety toward the past or respect for tradition, the great mass of men and women still bow to the dictates of fashion and never wholly escape the more insidious influences of advertising and propaganda. The substitution of fashion for custom and of propaganda for tradition is no doubt to be interpreted as a more or less inevitable incident of progress and of the cultural emancipation of mankind, just as one expects a flock of quacks to follow the wake of every advance in medical science, or a new outbreak of crime to follow every effort to enforce by police regulation a rule of conduct that is not

²The notion that society and intellectual life have advanced as a consequence of events that disturbed a pre-existing social equilibrium and undermined an inherited social order is the catastrophic theory of progress. It is not Bagehot's invention but has been put forward, in one form or another and at one time or another, by a long line of humanists and non-professional students of society and human nature. (See Frederick J. Teggart, *Theory of History* (New Haven, 1925), ch. xv, "The Method of Hume and Turgot.")

³George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago, 1934), p. 133.

supported by the mores and the general consensus of society. This, briefly and in substance, is Bagehot's account of political society.

In re-reading, after many years, Bagehot's notable little volume I am impressed again, as I have been before, with the number of instances in which social science has been indebted for some of its more profound and penetrating insights to laymen, rather than to professional students, that is to say, to men whose sources of knowledge are a wide acquaintance with men and affairs, rather than the methodical inquiries of systematic science. Walter Bagehot is an instance, but it would not be difficult to name others. Adam Smith, for example, who wrote not only *The Wealth of Nations*, but *The Moral Sentiments*; William Graham Sumner, whose *Folkways*, one of the most widely read and influential books in the field of sociology, is actually a quite unsystematic collection of notes and comments on the author's wide-ranging reading in ethnological and historical literature. Graham Wallas, author of *Human Nature in Politics* and *The Great Society*, is another example of a writer whose knowledge is largely that of a curious observer of men and their ways rather than of systematic investigation of society and human nature. One might even include among the list of these unprofessional students a philosopher and sociologist like Georg Simmel, whose observations on human relations and the "social mind" are often quite as subtle and penetrating as are those of Freud and the psychoanalysts upon the more obscure aspects of the individual psyche.

None of these men, with the possible exception of Simmel, were systematic students of society. They were, however, men whose intellectual interests led them to range widely over the surface of events and to reflect deeply upon the human scene in the various aspects in which it presented itself to them. One might describe them, perhaps, as human naturalists, curious and interested observers of human relations, somewhat as Darwin and the naturalists of the last century were of the interrelations of the lesser organisms. It is worth noting, also, that while these men were not primarily interested, as more systematic students of society are likely to be, in the logical and methodological problems of the social sciences, there were often implicit in their writings, ideas and insights which if carried out into some greater detail might have supplied a logical framework for more systematic and more scientific investigations.

At any rate, Bagehot's attempt to discover what one might describe as "the mechanisms of progress" in order to make intelligible the rise of the modern world, serves admirably to lift into plain view what is sociologically significant in the present world crisis, and to indicate its relation to what is, perhaps, the most fundamental problem with which

students of society have everywhere had to deal, the problem, namely, of social change.

There have always been, it seems, a limited number of theoretic problems to which every "system" or frame of reference for the study of society must find an answer, and although different students will conceive and formulate these solutions differently, the problems remain essentially the same. Every society, for example, possesses a structure and every such social structure has presumably come into existence and is maintained by some sort of process or processes. In analysing and describing social phenomena some writers have emphasized the aspect of process, others structure.

Almost every fundamental problem of society, whether theoretical or practical, revolves finally, it seems, about the necessity of reconciling changes in the social order with the perpetuation of the function for which that order exists; with the necessity, of reconciling freedom with security, and social change with social progress.

In the natural history of human relations there has always been, to use an ecological term, some sort of succession. There has been, for example, the rise and the fall of empires, and with these apparently cyclical changes there has been some sort of discontinuous progress. There has been progress probably because there has always been the possibility of including more territory and more people within the limits of a single economy, which in turn has insured the existence of a greater specialization of function and a wider division of labour. But the modern progress, as the modern man understands it, is an invention of not merely the modern but the occidental world. It was unknown to the ancient Greeks and Romans. "It was not" as Bagehot remarks, "that they rejected the idea; they did not entertain it."

In the modern world, on the other hand, progress is not simply a term describing a particular form of social change, i.e. change characterized by a long-time secular trend. It is rather an ideal and an article of faith. Walter Bagehot seems to have shared this faith, not in a continuous and irreversible, but in an intermittent and ultimate progress. Further and continued progress, however, was likely to be confined to Europe. However, Bagehot's conception of progress and of the historical process was based on his observations of a world that no longer exists. What we see going on about us today seems, in many respects, a reversal of all that his discussion of the evolution of political society might have led us to expect.

Bagehot lived at a time when the people of Europe were enjoying at once a degree of personal freedom and personal security such as they probably never experienced before and may never know again. Europe

was just beginning in 1870 to reap the full fruits of the industrial revolution. The age of discovery which began with Columbus was presently to be completed with the rediscovery of Africa by Livingstone and Stanley. Technological inventions had made Europe the active and dominant centre of a new, world-wide civilization and at the same time, of a political and cultural domination which the steamship and the locomotive were presently destined to extend to the most remote regions of the earth. England had reached, or nearly so, the zenith of its political power and influence in the world. The wide-flung British Empire seemed, at the moment, to hold the whole world in its embrace. The problem of population which had troubled Malthus in the early part of the century and had suggested to Darwin his theory of the origin of the species, seemed to have been solved as a result of the world-wide division of labour, which the expansion of the world market had made possible.

The progress of science and technological inventions have continued at an even more rapid rate since that time, but Europe is no longer the only politically or culturally active centre in an otherwise passive world. Something has happened to reawaken intellectual life in the "arrested civilizations" of the Orient. In all the states of Europe where technological advancement has been greatest, populations are declining. In other parts of the world that were formerly passive, notably Japan, China, and India, population is increasing.

The world, which in 1870 seemed to offer a limitless space for expansion is today overcrowded. Economists are busy inventorying its resources and reckoning the time when they will be exhausted. No longer is Europe expanding. Migration has practically ceased. International trade has declined. European civilization has reached its territorial limits and great powers are engaged in a desperate struggle for living room, *Lebensraum*.

But if the trend which Bagehot plotted has changed, the processes he described continue. Furthermore, with the change in the trend there has been a corresponding change in the ideology and in the unconscious assumptions by which men live. Walter Lippmann says the intellectual climate of western Europe began to change somewhere between 1848 and 1870, and since 1870 liberal philosophy has been on the defensive and liberals have been fighting a losing rear-guard action. Since 1874 there has been a steady trend toward the substitution of the authority and control of the state in the place of the freedom and responsibility of the individual man.⁴

⁴After 1870 or thereabouts, men thought instinctively once more in terms of organization, authority, and collective power. To enhance their prospects business men looked to tariffs, to concentrated corporate control, to the suppression of competition, to

Meanwhile, and as a consequence of changes in life conditions which technological changes have made, there has been general change in the attitude of men of science and the modern world with respect to the relation of science to human welfare. Thus a year ago, in an address before the National Academy of Sciences, Sir William Bragg said: "The effect of science upon social relations and social conditions has become very great, and the gains are obvious. Yet science does not appear to be in all cases beneficent. It has become a matter of anxious consideration whether or no the increase in the knowledge of nature must necessarily bring evil as well as good." This is not the isolated utterance of a single individual. On the contrary, Sir William's words merely reflect the doubts and misgivings of thoughtful men in every avenue of life. Men are now beginning, it seems, to reckon with the cost of progress asking themselves whether, at the moment, the balance is on the credit or the debit side of the ledger.

"Science and its applications are not only transforming the physical and mental environment of men; but are adding greatly"—this is the language of the American Association for the Advancement of Science—"to the complexities of their social, economic and political life."⁵ There are obvious reasons, it seems, why at the present, when totalitarian governments have subordinated science, as they have every other social function, to their national policies, men of science should be concerned about the future of science. It explains why the American Association for the Advancement of Science, after proclaiming as a fundamental article of faith that "Science is wholly independent of national boundaries and races and creeds and can flourish permanently only where there is peace and intellectual freedom," decided to make "as one of its objectives an examination of the profound effects of science upon society."⁶

But this problem of the relation of physical science and technology to society and social conditions which Sir William Bragg described as "a subject of the first importance of the whole world," is neither as novel nor as recent as one might assume from the interest it has aroused since the rise of the totalitarian governments.

large scale business administration. To relieve the poor and lift up the downtrodden, reformers looked to an organized working class, to electoral majorities, to the capture of the sovereign power and its exploitation in their behalf. Though great corporate capitalists continued to invoke the shibboleths of liberalism when confronted by the collective demands of the workers or the hostile power of popular majorities, yet they were thoroughly imbued with the collectivist spirit through their attachment to protection and to the concentration of control. Walter Lippman, *The Good Society* (Boston, 1937), p. 47.

⁵*Science*, vol. XC, Sept. 29, 1939, p. 294.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 294.

Brooks Adams seems to have predicted the present crisis thirty-seven years ago. At that time, including much else that is pertinent to this discussion, he said: "No established type of mind can adapt itself to changes in environment, even in slow-moving civilizations, as fast as environment change. . . . To us, however, the most distressing aspect of the situation is that the social acceleration is progressive in proportion to the activity of the scientific mind which makes mechanical discoveries, and it is therefore a triumphant science which produces those ever more rapidly recurring changes in environment to which men must adapt themselves at their peril."

The influence of physics and the physical sciences upon society and social life are naturally more obvious in the field of technology than elsewhere. The modern world has passed successfully through the age of iron, steel, and electricity and now it is struggling to adapt itself to an age in which the social structure is largely determined by the automobile, the tractor, and the aeroplane. These mechanical devices have sometimes been devastating in their effects, but at the same time they have been regenerating. In every case, however, they have invariably drawn closer and tighter that steadily expanding web of mutual interdependence we call *society*.

Technological devices have naturally changed men's habits and in doing so they have necessarily modified the structure and functions of society. The general nature of these changes may be described as follows: (1) change in the character of man's relation to the soil and to his natural habitat; (2) changes in his relations to other men.

With the aid of machinery, man has become less and less immediately dependent upon the natural resources of his habitat and more and more dependent upon a complex social organization, through which these resources are collected, manufactured, and distributed. The result is that the food quest in the modern world has ceased to be what it once was—a search for food—and has become rather a hunt for a job.

It is naturally the great cities that have most completely transformed the human habitat and imposed upon human beings the discipline of a more completely mechanized world. Perhaps that is why social problems in great cities have, in recent years, uniformly assumed a technological character. They have become problems in social engineering. Every function of life, as it becomes rationalized, tends to be carried on, it seems, with the assistance of some sort of expert and with the aid of some sort of machine.

The modern city has long since ceased to be what the peasant village

¹Brooks Adams, *The Theory of Social Revolutions*, quoted by Elton Mayo, in *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (New York, 1938), p. 175.

was, an agglomeration of individual habitations. Rather, it is like the civilization of which it is the centre and focus, a vast physical and institutional structure in which men live, like bees in a hive, under conditions such that their activities are considerably more regulated, regimented, and conditioned than is likely to appear to the spectator or be perceived by the habitant.

In order to be specific as to the changes which technology has made in the character of social relations, it will be advantageous if not necessary to say something as to the nature of the thing we call society. Assuming that any association in which individuals carry on a common life is a society, the types of association which we expect to find in a society of human beings are (1) territorial, (2) economic, (3) political, and (4) cultural, corresponding to the different social sciences, i.e. human ecology, economics, politics, and sociology or cultural anthropology.

The territorial order. Geography and the territorial organization of society get their importance from the fact that personal and social relations are determined largely by physical distances, and that social stability is insured when human beings are rooted in the soil. On the other hand, the most drastic changes in society are likely to be those that involve mobility and, particularly, mass migrations of peoples. Thus Frederick Teggart, and others who adhere to the catastrophic theory of progress, believe that most of the great advances in civilization are due, directly or indirectly, to the migration of peoples and the catastrophic changes which have accompanied them.

From this point of view it seems that every technical device, from the wheelbarrow to the aeroplane, in so far as it provided a new and more effective means of locomotion, has, or should have marked an epoch in history. This is so far true as most other important changes in civilization are likely to be correlated with changes in the means of transportation and communication. It is said likewise that every civilization carries in itself the seeds of its own destruction. Such seeds are likely to be the technical devices that introduce a new social order and usher out an old.

The economic or competitive order. Living creatures not only attract and repel others, as do physical objects, but they also compete with one another. Economic relations, wherever they exist, are the products of competition; but competition eventually brings about some sort of co-operation, which in the case of human beings takes the form of an exchange of goods and services. The economic order is the product of trade. The market, and the area over which exchange takes place, mark the centres and limits of economic society.

It is obvious that technological devices have profoundly affected

economic relations. In improving the means of transportation they have progressively extended the limits of the world market and of economic society. They have made mass production and mass distribution possible and are directly responsible for the existence of the capitalistic system as we know it. In so far as they have brought the divers peoples of the earth into a world-wide web of economic relations, technological devices have laid the basis for a world-wide political society and eventually of a moral and cultural order that will include all mankind. Finally, civilization, as distinguished from local and tribal cultures, is the product of commerce and the incidental division of labour which commerce not only permits but ensures.

Elliot Smith, the English anthropologist, in an account of certain of our primitive contemporaries, says:

They have, of course, no agriculture and no domesticated animals, except the dog in some cases. They do not build permanent houses, and at most make rough shelters. They would seem formerly to have gone about naked, as many of them still do. They are ignorant of pottery-making, and of metal-working. They have no social classes, and usually no organization in clans or other similar social groupings. In fact, their condition can truly be defined as being practically devoid of social institutions. Many of them still live in this original way in natural family groups, such, for example, as are found among the gorillas and other anthropoid apes.⁸

We have only to compare the material and intellectual wealth of modern civilized peoples with the material and intellectual poverty of primitive peoples to gain some concrete notion of what the physical sciences have contributed to society as we know it and to human welfare as we understand it.

The political order. Disregarding for the moment the fact that human beings have their origins and owe most of their personal and distinctively human traits to the intimate associations imposed by the family, let us consider the significance of the fact that we are actually living today in the Great Society, whose dimensions and characteristics have been described by Graham Wallas, in his volume of that title. That means that we are living in a world in which, no matter how limited or how intimate our relations with certain individuals, we are nevertheless involved, at the same time, with all other living creatures in what Darwin calls "the web of life." Under these circumstances our most abstract and impersonal relations with other human beings are likely to be territorial and symbiotic rather than social, that is to say each individual will be living in some more or less unconscious dependence upon every other at least in the same habitat. The next, somewhat more limited area of human relationships, is that which includes individuals living

⁸Elliot Smith, *Human History* (New York, 1929), p. 183.

in the same economy in which there is some recognized division of labour and some regular exchange of goods and services, all more or less regulated by custom and law. Following this, we are involved in a more limited as well as a more intimate circle of relationship which we call political. We may describe as political that relationship which constitutes society, as organized on a territorial rather than a familial basis.

It is characteristic of a political society that within the limits of its authority, rights and duties of individuals are more or less defined and, if necessary, enforced either by the formal laws, sanction of custom, or power. Obviously the state and the political organization of society is based on a less inclusive and more concrete and intimate circle of relationships than the area of trade and commercial relations in which it exists. It is equally obvious that the circle of relations between individual citizens of a state or the inhabitants of any of its dependencies is necessarily more inclusive, but less intimate than ordinarily exists in the family, the tribe, or any other genetic group.

If we look at the structure of society as a whole, with respect to the degree of interdependence and intimacy of the relations in which individuals live, we shall see that human relations seem to take the form (1) of a vast cone or, when projected on a flat surface, (2) of a triangle, the base of which—taking into account the present interdependence of every part of the world on every other—may be the whole human species. The individual, on the other hand, with the family of which he is a member, will be located at the apex.

This puts the existing population of the world at the bottom and the individual person at the top and divides society and social relations into the different strata with each of which a special science is concerned. The human-relations' pyramid, if I may so describe it, will serve at the same time as a diagrammatic description of the character of the influences that operate to form the individual personality. In accordance with this diagram we may conceive the socialized person at the apex of the triangle as an ultimate expression of the biological individual after he has been conditioned by association with other individuals on the different levels of association.


He may be conceived as beginning life as a biologic individual at the lowest or biotic level of existence. In the course of his career, however, his elementary and instinctive drives will be modified and redefined and sublimated by his contact with other individuals. Thus in the course of his career, starting as a mere biologic individual, he achieves the character and the status of a person, i.e. a socialized individual.

Returning, after this digression, to the political organization of society, one observes, particularly in so far as it tends to involve personal

and moral rather than physical relationships, that it is relatively less dependent upon technology than upon abstract and formal relationships. On the other hand, in so far as politics involves war as a part of its method of settling disputes, it is quite as dependent upon armament as it is upon a form of discipline which tends to convert the individual man into a mere instrument of some other man or group of men.

It is nevertheless true, that the political power which a state or any political institution exercises either within or without the limits of its domain, rests upon the loyalties which the state and its cause inspire in the personal attachments of individuals to the soil, its association, traditions, and eventually in the personal loyalties which these associations have created and maintained.

Political power rests, as do other social forces, upon transportation, communication, as well as upon discipline and community of interest, but it rests finally on something less material and less rational, namely,



social solidarity and morale. It is these that make it possible for great bodies of men, including those who are organized and those who are not, to act collectively and consistently in such a manner as to preserve the corporate existence of the nation or the empire and its institutions—institutions which have become, by use and wont,—fixed in the habits and the very structure of man.

The cultural order. More intimate and less formal than the political, is the system of relations we call cultural. Culture, so far as it is embodied in folkways rather than artifacts, is, in fact, the “cement” which according to Bagehot first held men together within the bonds of a social order that was customary and traditional rather than instinctive and biological. It is this same culture, embodied in habit and custom, that constituted “the yoke of custom” which man, under the rationalizing and secularizing influence of science, has so successfully and so completely thrown off.

The thing we call society is, of course, something more than a population aggregate having a territorial configuration; something more than "a geographical expression," or even an association for the exchange of goods and service. Society, in the sense in which that term is applied to human beings, is characterized by the fact that it imposes upon the free play of economic and egoistic forces the restraints of a political and a moral order. Yet, custom, conventions, and law, by which society exercises control over the individual and itself, turn out finally to be the products of communication; and communication is, as Bridgman, the physicist, shrewdly remarks, "a device by which one endeavors as far as possible to anticipate the probable future actions of his fellows and so put himself in a position to make the necessary preparations."⁹

But communication is something more than Bridgman's description indicates. It is a social-psychological process by which one individual is enabled to assume, in some sense and to some degree, the attitudes and the point of view of another; it is the process by which a rational and moral order among men is substituted for one that is merely physiological and instinctive. Communication "spins a web of custom and mutual expectation which bind together social entities as diverse as the family group, a labor organization, or the haggling participants in a village market." On the other hand, particularly when it takes the form of dialectical discussion, communication tends to individualize thought and bring out distinctions within the limits of a common understanding and universe of discourse. In this fashion communication tends to assume a rational rather than the intuitive form characteristic of ordinary intercourse.

Communication and competition seem to be the two fundamental processes, or forms of interaction, by which a social order is initiated and maintained among the individuals whose life in common is the life of society. Communication is, on the whole, an integrating and socializing process. It creates the loyalties and understandings that make concerted and consistent collective action possible. It is by communication that the great fund of knowledge, which we call science, is accumulated and transmitted. Science, may, in fact, be regarded as the kind of knowledge that can be communicated, and the kind of knowledge that grows and becomes more abstract and more precise by transmission.

I have gone into some detail in my description of the role and function of communication because it is so obviously fundamental to the social process, and because the extensions and improvements which the physical sciences have made to the means of communication are so vital to the existence of society and particularly of that more rationally or-

⁹P. W. Bridgman, *The Intelligent Individual and Society* (New York, 1938).

ganized form of society we call civilization. Having said so much, it is scarcely necessary to point out again the importance of the printing press, telephone, telegraph, phonograph, radio, and cinema in bringing about the revolutionary changes in political and cultural life that are visibly going on about us. All these instrumentalities, separately and together, have for one thing made possible the most extraordinary concentrations of political power that the world has ever known. The fact becomes all the more significant as we observe the extent to which it has been possible, through means devised by science, to mobilize these vast imponderable social forces—the sentiments of fear and of loyalty—and put them into the hands of single individuals or a group of individuals; for example, the dictators and their privy counselors.

I have attempted to suggest briefly, the extent to which physics and the applications of physical science have entered into the warp and woof of present-day social life. I have sought to make some estimate of the material resources which science and technology have made available for the uses of the modern world. The question which finally poses itself is this: has science, in awakening the vast energies that are resident in the material world, brought into existence forces which science cannot hope to control? This, I take it, was implied in the question as formulated by Sir William Bragg in the address from which I have quoted.

The problem that remains to be solved, therefore, is how to create moral forces that will not merely counter-balance but control the forces which physical science has unleashed, making them the instruments for the re-creation of man and his world rather than their destruction. Stated in this form the problem seems to be—if a problem for science at all—one for the social rather than the physical sciences. This may seem to put it outside the limits of any sort of scientific inquiry, for it is doubtful whether there is, or ever will be, a science of society in the sense in which that term is used of the physical sciences. One of the important, perhaps the most important, contributions which physics and the physical sciences have made to society is one to which I have so far made no reference. We are indebted to the physical sciences for a method of inquiry, perhaps the only method that can properly be called scientific, which, by making knowledge exact has made it at the same time systematic. In a systematic science each new contribution to knowledge serves as a check on all that has gone before. At the same time what has gone before provides a frame of reference for all that follows.

It is in the field of physical nature more than elsewhere that science has been most successful in reducing things to their elements and of describing the relations between these elements in purely mechanical terms, making them in this way as obvious and intelligible as the rela-

tion between the parts of a machine. There is nothing more rational and less mystical than a machine and it is for this reason, perhaps, that in every field of research, psychology, sociology, or politics, science is looking for mechanisms, seeking to describe the relations it discovers in mechanical terms. Thus physiologists and psychologists are looking for mental and physical mechanisms. The experimental "conditioning" of the organism which has played so important a part in the researches of physiologists and psychologists in recent years is a process by which an inherited instinct, or at any rate an established mechanism-habit, is modified and a new mechanism and a new habit are established in its place. As I am writing these lines my eyes have fallen upon a passage in a recent copy of *Science* in which a writer, discussing the physiology of old age—a subject in which I find I have an increasing interest—remarks that something further was needed than is now known "to clarify the mechanism of senescence."¹⁰ Much is needed that we do not know to clarify the mechanisms of social relations and the super-organism.

I am not at all certain what sort of definition one should give to the term mechanism as it is used in the social sciences. It is, at any rate, employed to describe a relation between things rather than between ideas, a relation that may be defined with precision and which in operation insures, to the proper impulse, the expected response. As we speak of mental mechanisms so we may and do, in much the same sense, speak of social mechanisms. We are all of us familiar with situations, particularly in the field of personal relations, where an expression on the part of A seems automatically to call forth a corresponding reaction in B. Thus a harsh word or contemptuous expression upon the part of A will call forth, more or less automatically, a response of resentment and perhaps permanent ill-will in B. These are mental and, at the same time, social mechanisms, and if we recognize them when we see them and understand the complexities of their operation we can predict, with some assurance, what the normally expected response to a specific gesture, attitude, or expression will be.

The social sciences have certainly not been unaffected by the method and conceptions of the physical sciences, and this influence has served at any rate to take social studies out of the field of purely dialectical discussion, and direct inquiry to the relation of things rather than ideas. When, however, writers like Wesley Mitchell tell us that in view of the present condition of the world, "the most urgent item of unfinished business is to increase our knowledge of human behavior," and when he adds "preaching righteousness" and "appeals to reason" are not enough, one wonders just what kind of knowledge he is thinking of. It cannot

¹⁰*Science*, Jan. 5, 1940.

be the sort of systematic and scientific knowledge one gets of human nature from the findings of the psychological laboratories.

The knowledge of human nature that we need most, it seems to me, is of the type I have referred to—using an expression of William James,—as “acquaintance with.” By that I mean the sort of knowledge “one inevitably acquires in the course of one’s first hand encounters with the world about him.” “Human beings have an extraordinary ability, by whatever mechanism that ability operates, to sense these tendencies to action in others as in themselves. It takes a long time, however, to become thoroughly acquainted with any human being, including one’s self.”¹¹ Nevertheless, that is the kind of knowledge we need of human beings, in order to know them not in any such sense as science demands, but merely to become aware, by observation and exploration, as the psychiatrists have become aware, of the nature of human relations. What we need then, is not merely more facts, but more insight; not less logic but more understanding.

What we need more than anything else—seeing that the old order is manifestly passing—is a conception of society and of human relations that will include within the perspective of a single point of view all the diverse tendencies and forces that are obviously and actively operative in bringing about the changes we are now witnessing in the existing world order. As Europe and the occidental world seem to have completed, or nearly so, a cycle of irreversible change and as we are obviously approaching the end of an era, we need, for the purpose of social and sociological science, a new orientation and, if not a new faith, a renewal of the old.

Machines have done much, as I have already indicated, to change the character of human relations but it still seems doubtful to most of us, that we shall ever be able to devise any mechanism, physical or social, that will satisfactorily solve the ultimate social problem. For society is fundamentally a biological phenomenon and institutions are not enacted, but like trees they grow. Society is something that cannot be taken apart and put together again. It is not an artifact. It has, like the tree, the principle of its existence, as Aristotle would say, within itself rather than outside, as in the case of a machine. Furthermore, the nature of human relations and of society is such that we must think of society as composed of individuals to be sure, but of individuals held together not by rational purposes merely, not wholly by laws, constitution, and contracts, but by sentiments and loyalties, sentiments that have become incorporated by use and want into the habits of individuals, and in the structure of society. The very existence of customs,

¹¹Robert E. Park, “News as a Form of Knowledge: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge” (*American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XLV, March, 1940, p. 671).

law, and a tradition that insure the permanence and the solidarity of the social structure rests finally on the fact that human beings possess an imagination which enables them to enter into other minds and make their thoughts and feelings, in some way and to some extent, their own. The existence of society in which men can live a life of reason is dependent finally on the existence of a body of tradition, sentiments, beliefs, and personal loyalties that can be understood and shared but which are not rational, not at least in the sense that a machine is rational.

Some years ago Elton Mayo, of the Harvard School of Business Administration, published a very interesting volume based on observations and experiments which have been carried on for the past seven years or more in the shops of the General Electric Company at Hawthorne, Illinois. It was entitled *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization*.¹² The thesis of this volume, though the author did not state it as badly as I shall, was that the trouble with industry in the United States, and, in fact, the cause for the disorder, unrest, and chaos in industrial society generally, is too much "scientific management," too much rational planning, too much machinery, too much regimentation and arbitrary control of the natural and free expression of organic life of the individual and society. The rapid advance of technology—and here he repeats what others have said,—has brought about too rapid changes in the conditions of social life. The great body of custom which ordinarily directs life in the older, smaller, and thoroughly integrated forms of society that still exist in many parts of Europe and in some parts of North America, the province of Quebec for instance, has been, like the soil in many parts of our country, eroded and washed out. We have developed progressively a condition of what Durkheim describes as *anomie*, a kind of constitutional disintegration of traditional society.

The present plight of the United States and the world constitutes, it seems, a problem which, fundamentally conceived, is neither economic nor political but cultural. It is, therefore, a problem in the field of social anthropology or, perhaps, social psychiatry, if such a thing exists. The attitude of the natural sciences toward social institutions is notoriously opposed to that of social or cultural anthropology. The physical scientist, observing that social institutions and social practices are often crude and inefficient; that popular beliefs and religious practices are frequently based on wishful thinking, mistaken interpretation of fact, and the inherent stupidity of mankind, has been disposed to plow them under as just so much superstition, and substitute for the traditional culture the rational novelties of an ever-expanding natural science. Anthropologists, on the other hand, recognizing that social institutions,

¹²New York, 1933.

however crude or imperfect, perform, nevertheless, in the societies in which they exist, a more or less indispensable function, are disposed to protect and preserve them, even in their more primitive forms, preserve them at least until they have learned to understand their role and importance in the cultures of which they are a part.

There are two specific ways in which the procedure of the anthropologists in dealing with cultural institutions differ from the methods of the more exact and so-called "measuring" sciences. In the first place, physical science deals with things in segments. Anthropology, on the other hand, conceiving society as an organism and culture as a unit, has sought to deal with its separate functions as aspects of an integrated whole. Sociologists, likewise, whose function as sometimes conceived, has been to reform society, have discovered that reform of one institution is likely to create a problem in another. In the second place, the social anthropologist invariably seeks, as I have suggested, to understand the people and the culture that he investigates. He recognizes that personal sentiments and religious beliefs, though not wholly rational, are nevertheless a necessary part of the life of individuals and of society, and that even superstitions have their values.

In China, a few years ago, I made the acquaintance of a young Chinese sociologist who had studied in America and had finished his course by marrying and taking home an American wife. In the course of time they had a little daughter, who, having learned Chinese as the custom is in China from her amah, had become so fluent that she ordinarily spoke in Chinese to her mother. Her mother, on the other hand, insisted upon speaking English to her, as it seemed important that she should become, as most Chinese students in fact are, bilingual. One day the American mother said to her Chinese daughter, calling her by her Chinese name,—we will call her Anna,—“Anna, there are some things that you are in the habit of doing that I do not like. I want to talk them over with you and perhaps after that you will not want to do them any more.” That seemed fair to Anna and she readily assented. Then her mother had a second thought and she added: “But there may be things that I do which you do not like and if that is so I wish you would tell me about them and I will try to do better.” That seemed wholly satisfactory to Anna, who waited patiently until her mother had finished. Then Anna who was, as I remember, about six years old, said: “Well mamma, there are some things I wish you would do. I wish for one thing you would speak more Chinese and then, I wish mamma, you had more superstitions.”

Well, there is certainly one thing in which China has the better of the United States, particularly of the middle west, and that is in the

number and quality of its superstitions. I suspect it is the superstitions, folklore, and local traditions which Elton Mayo misses in America. These are particularly absent in our great cities and our factory towns. They seem to constitute the soil in which culture and those common understandings which make social life tolerable grow. They make life tolerable even when the technological devices and gadgets of a higher civilization are absent. Where, on the other hand, these customary familiar and folksy things, including the associations that go with them, are absent, it is as if everything that made it difficult to leave home was gone.

In any case, it is important to remember, in considering the function of superstitions and folklore, as of religious beliefs, that in the life of the community science is, after all, merely secondary and instrumental. Man can live, and has lived without science but not without some sort of philosophy of life, and some sort of religious faith. In fact science would be meaningless without these.

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SOCIOLOGY AS A SPECIALIZED SCIENCE

COMTE, writing a century ago, claimed that in human affairs we were just entering the scientific stage. Already the physical sciences had made an auspicious beginning. They have made spectacular advances since Comte's pronouncement. Nevertheless, extensive areas in the physical sciences remain to be explored. Still wider areas in the domain of the social sciences await systematic investigation and precise analysis. The need for scientific advances as a means of meeting recurring crises in human affairs seems more necessary than in the days of Comte. It is quite evident today that we have greater sophistication, more extensive questioning, and a more marked social self-consciousness. The word scientific, widely and loosely used, seems to symbolize the temper of our age. The basic assumptions concerning the nature of science contained in this paper are expressed clearly in the following statement.

... the definition of science here given has stressed the character of science as a representation, or scheme, for anticipating the future course of phenomena and not at all as a body of laws directly governing reality... science is considered as a methodological system of approach... The same methodological—as opposed to ontological—interpretation of science is calculated to remove the difficulties in the way of putting social sciences under the same roof with the natural or physical sciences. In the endless controversies... in recent years... the real problem has hinged on the fact that the natural sciences, conceived as embodying the absolute laws of reality, have been characterized by mechanism and deterministic predictability, whereas people have hesitated to consign the field of human and social sciences on an exclusive basis to ontological mechanism and determinism. But on a methodological interpretation of science, and hence of scientific mechanism, it is not necessary to force all aspects of social reality into scientific mechanism as if it were a bed of Procrustis into which all must fit and nothing hang out. Scientific mechanism may be applicable to social reality so long as there is a static, stable factor in that reality to support it, but the application of scientific mechanism does not *ipso facto* exclude the existence of other manifestations of social reality not intelligible in terms of mechanism or the existence of other approaches and disciplines which have developed from these non-mechanistic aspects.¹

Sociological origins. If we go back to beginnings we find philosophy emerging from history. Coming to the time of Aristotle and Plato, philosophy embraced the forerunners of the physical and social sciences. The beginning of the nineteenth century saw mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology, and biology well on their way as separate sciences but remaining susceptible to the tutelage of philosophy in criticizing their theories. One by one they emerged and learned to play their specialized roles, but continued to retain vestiges of their philosophical origin. About the last to emerge was sociology. Its founder was Au-

¹Benjamin Ginsberg in *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, vol. XIII, p. 592.

guste Comte, but like many another discipline it is traceable to an intellectual ferment that long antedated its founder.

Sociology was conceived in the grand manner, comprehending the results of all other sciences and aiming to bring orderliness and direction to the tangled skein of human events. The new Comtean science sought to wipe out the traditional distinctions between history, philosophy, and the natural sciences. Social life was conceived as an organic whole changing according to ascertainable laws, knowledge of which promised predictability and orderly adjustment in human affairs. The chief contribution of Comte was his insistence that individuals are something more than the discrete entities of census enumerators and present-day individualistic psychologists. They are linked together in groups, are subject to common sentiments, and possess a common culture, in short, consensus. No doubt Comte conceived society somewhat mystically, but he did give a permanent impetus to an objective and systematic study of collective behaviour.

The grand manner in sociological conception was continued by Herbert Spencer. He too described society as a social organism. For him the emphasis was on division of labour, on competitive co-operation rather than on consensus. Some decades later Durkheim explained that these two aspects of human societies, solidarity on the basis of a division of labour and solidarity in terms of consensus, are two aspects of the social organism. He too continued to think of social life as a whole. His chief contribution lay in his conception of collective representations or the ways in which individual experiences become objective, public, and are held in common by members of a social group. They are products of social interaction and are the stabilizing forms through which social continuities are effected.

These originators of sociology and their successors have brought to the fore the point of view that the social relationships of men, whether in terms of customs or more formally organized social institutions, are realities that can be described and explained objectively. Herein lies the assumption that social structures are just as real as biological structures, that like the latter they have a natural history, that is, they emerge and change in predictable ways. This naturalistic approach to the study of man and his institutions was aided by the development of biology. Popular interest in this subject destroyed for many the notion that man stood uniquely separated from nature. The placing of man in the realm of nature made inevitable the tendency to study his social life as the product of the play of natural forces.

Important as were the nineteenth-century speculations of the philosophers of history in the eventual establishment of sociology, its roots

are traceable to other movements much more intellectually plebeian in character. In a sense these movements paralleled the efforts of men like Comte and Spencer and were different types of response to the same general social situation. By this situation I mean that series of changes known historically as the industrial revolution. The nineteenth century saw the Western world unloosed from its old moorings. New worlds of open resources were entered by ambitious entrepreneurs. Capital and men migrated to new areas of settlement. Markets expanded and industries concentrated in new and rapidly growing cities. These economic changes were accompanied by equally marked social changes. The older institutional garments were no fit for the new leviathan. One phase of the trial and error process in the development of social controls appropriate to changed conditions was the activities and the utopian dreams of the reformers. These dreams were a response to the unrest, uncertainty, and wretchedness which belong to this transitional period. The reformers gave vivid publicity to observations concerning ill-health, poverty, the exploitation of children, delinquency, and other designated ills. Theirs was not the temper of the scientist. They wanted action. They agitated for panaceas. Their efforts were some of the haphazard ways of discovering what social arrangements might wrest security from chaos. Some of these advocated reforms succeeded. Others failed. But their aftermath of failure and disillusionment gave birth to a more systematic study of the forces which had brought to the fore the reformers' problems. Thus objective and systematic thinking about the nature of classes and institutions was one of the important by-products of a series of reform movements in nineteenth-century England and North America.

In these same countries, too, was to be found an extensive proliferation of ameliorative social services which were the forerunners of present-day professional social work agencies. These measures solved some problems; they created new problems of duplication and unintentional dependency. The latter gave rise to the Social Survey Movement which had two results. One was of interest particularly to social workers because social surveying helped to develop a more effective technical and administrative system in social work. The other was in the field of sociological interest. In a concrete and realistic manner the social survey brought to the fore some of the facts of collective behaviour. It focused attention also on the community as a unit of sociological study. From this vantage ground it was but a short step to the study of its diversified groups, and how their structure and functions emerge and change. Furthermore, the specialized interests of economists left unpossessed and uncharted a "borderland" of culture and social

organization, a system of social relationships which could be understood primarily in terms of social interaction rather than by reference to economic competition. Preliminary investigation of this enviroing social order made clear some of the factors limiting competition and drew attention to the role of non-pecuniary values in human affairs. Thus the need for a precise analysis of those cultural and institutional forms to which academic economists had given merely casual attention became apparent gradually to those within and outside the universities. In due course sociology emerged to reduce casual speculations regarding groups and institutions to a body of knowledge based on systematic research.

Having sketched briefly some of the factors involved in the development of sociology, certain questions may now be raised. Does sociology still manifest something of the grand manner associated with its speculative originator? Or has it taken a more modest place among the social sciences? While the emphasis on sociology as a specialized social science is predominant today, the wider and more inclusive point of view is still held by a few. I shall discuss the latter under the heading, "Sociology in the Guise of Social Philosophy."

Sociology in the guise of social philosophy. This point of view has followers in all countries but it continues to predominate in the sociological thinking of England rather than in America. While this point of view has dropped its organismic accent, it still retains something of the grandiose scheme to be found in the writings of Comte and Spencer. Recent statements of this conception of sociology have come to us in the writings of Morris Ginsberg, Karl Mannheim,² and J. Rumney.

The objection has been frequently raised that there is no place for sociology since its subject-matter has been parcelled out to a number of specialisms such as economics, politics, psychology, anthropology, history, jurisprudence, and religion. Rumney³ does not think this objection is quite justified but remarks, "even if it were, the existence of such separate specialisms does not preclude the existence of a more general science whose task it would be to relate their separate conclusions and deal with the more general conditions of social life. Indeed it makes it desirable and necessary. The existence of botany, physiology, biochemistry, etc. has not nullified the utility of biology, which studies the nature and conditions of living matter in general. In the same way the work of the separate social sciences does not preclude the existence of sociology, which studies the nature and conditions of social life as a whole. The social specialisms are so numerous and detailed today that the need for a general

²Note particularly statements made by Professors Ginsberg, Mannheim, and a number of others in *The Social Sciences* (London, 1936).

³J. Rumney, *Science of Society* (London, 1938), pp. 12-13.

science is urgent." Thus sociology must not only do the spade work in the areas of life not appropriated by the other social sciences, but it must also become aware in a detailed way of the findings in each field, keep the doors wide open between the specialists, and correct their hypotheses in the light of its wider knowledge. In short, from this point of view, sociology is a synoptic science. This seems to me to be the task ordinarily assumed by philosophy, and a particular branch known as social philosophy. Its speculations are both critical and evaluative. The breadth of their studies requires that social philosophers be relieved from the meticulous research of the scientist. Even so, few in our complex era have the breadth of knowledge required to carry the burden that Rumney would lay upon them. Now and then someone takes up the major tasks of a social philosophy. Few have done so with greater distinction than the late Professor L. T. Hobhouse. One of his statements is interesting in this connection. "General Sociology is neither a separate science complete, nor is it a mere synthesis of the social sciences. . . . It is rather a vitalizing principle that runs through all investigation, stimulating inquiry, correcting results, exhibiting the life of the whole in the parts and returning from a study of the parts to a fuller comprehension of the whole."⁴

No one in America has done more distinguished philosophical service for the social sciences in our time than Professor John Dewey. In closing an address on the relation of philosophy to the social sciences, he said: "It is a favorite idea of mine that we are now in the presence of an intellectual crisis similar to that in the seventeenth century. Then the crisis concerned the free creation of new ideas regarding physical nature, ideas that formed the points of departure for ways of observing and interpreting physical phenomena. Now the crisis concerns the initiation of new hypotheses regarding man, regarding the nature and significance of those human associations that form the various modes of social phenomena. What philosophy did three centuries ago for physical inquiry, it now has the opportunity of doing for social life."⁵ This sounds a note of hope. But any completely comprehensive assaying of the ideas of the sciences seems hardly likely in our time. For the world of thought and action has expanded enormously in recent decades. It was said of the synthesis of Herbert Spencer "that it was accepted as authoritative by all but the specialists in that particular branch of learning. Auguste Comte was equally comprehensive but even less accurate."⁶

⁴See *Sociological Review*, vol. I, p. 8.

⁵Wilson Gee (ed.), *Research in the Social Sciences* (New York, 1929), p. 265.

⁶W. F. Ogburn and A. Goldenweiser (eds.), *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations* (Boston, 1927), p. 1.

From time to time social theorists will emerge in the field of philosophy or in one of the social sciences who will do philosophical thinking on certain phases that concern social scientists. Even Professor Dewey has limited himself to a few significant items in his more precise social theorizing.

Divisions of labour with respect to the social sciences. The development of sociology as a science has been most noteworthy in America. Here life has been more heterogeneous, mobile, and arresting as an object of study, and here university organization has been more malleable. These factors gave rise to that experimentalism which permitted sociology to find its place and function in relation to the other social sciences. The equilibrium in the division of labour of the social sciences is relatively stable though it is disturbed from time to time by some of the more predacious or precocious among the social sciences. Occasionally the disturbance comes from some college administrator who, ignoring the functional relationship that now exists between the social sciences in most of the universities and colleges of North America, seeks to redefine their roles in keeping with notions of what education ought to be even if it is not. Recently it has become fashionable in certain circles to attempt to reverse the trends toward specialization in university studies. Such efforts have received such catch phrases as "integration of the social sciences" (or physical sciences) and "co-ordination of the sciences." They reflect a popular fear of "segmentation." Current anxiety in this connection has given rise to well-intentioned administrative groupings of allied sciences. One of the most naïve of these adventures in co-ordination was embodied in one university's studies in human relations. Departmental headquarters were arranged spatially to assure common objectives and concerted effort in achieving them. Neither spatial proximity nor other devices in co-ordination have been sufficient to turn the attention of the research worker away from his specialized interests and techniques. If such attempts became successful they would result in an extension of superficial and disappointing eclecticism. If one penetrates beneath the surface the natural interdependence of the social sciences is quite apparent. They have developed in a division of labour that makes it necessary for each to seek certain types of knowledge in allied disciplines. The findings of these sciences are public and communicable. It is the normal procedure for men working on specialized research projects to acquaint themselves with the results of other competent workers using different methods in studying some phase of the same or related phenomenon. Furthermore, the choice of borderline research projects, now quite common, facilitates this well-known tendency to find out what is going on among one's scientific neighbours. The

reader will recall many other natural ways in which scientists learn from each other. Significant discoveries in any specialized field tend very soon to get the attention of those in allied fields. It is then their task as scientists to make such discoveries integral parts of their own specialized disciplines. It may mean some redefinition of their concepts. A specialist must transmute to the coin of his realm the findings of research workers in allied fields. It is quite possible that social scientists borrow much more than they take pains to re-think in terms of their own sciences. Artificial co-ordination is not likely to transform the capable or the lethargic into creative scientists.

It is well to bear in mind that specialization has been made necessary by the very extensiveness and richness of our social heritage. In order that each new generation of college students, in particular, may come to possess this heritage with assurance, teachers and writers have arisen to transmit those phases of the total heritage with which their specializations have made them more thoroughly familiar. Furthermore, each of these sciences needs the quickening and additional knowledge which research makes possible. Without research, science, teachers of science, and eventually the minds of students stagnate. The development of research has made essential specialization between the social sciences and within them. This specialization is by no means complete. Since history, economics, political science, and psychology in part are closely related to sociology, I shall attempt to explain central points of emphasis in each of these subjects.

Like memory in the individual it is the function of history to accumulate and conserve the fund of experience. If one follows the reflections of Windelband, Rickert, and Troeltsch, it can be maintained that history deals with a stream of events which occur but once and are thus unique in time and place. Sociology, in keeping with its natural science point of view, is concerned with stripping the uniqueness from events and reorganizing them as facts that are repeatable in other situations similar in type. The sociologist abstracts from the unique events of history a series of logically connected situations. To describe and explain this series is thus to pass from graphic history to history in the abstract or from general history to natural history, i.e. the history of a typical group or a typical institution. Special explanatory concepts and hypotheses are used to collect these more abstract facts and organize them in a way to describe and explain adequately the life-cycle of the group or institution so studied. Examples of what I mean by this type of history are illustrated by Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage* (New York, 1929), Hiller's *Strike: A Study in Collective Action* (Chicago, 1928), Hughes's *The Growth of an Institution—the Chicago Real Estate Board*

(Chicago, 1931), and Max Weber's studies in the sociology of religion.⁷ When the historian turns from the study of events to the study of social institutions he tends to become a sociologist. May I emphasize here that the construction of dependable abstract generalizations, which we call laws, from the stream of history, does not distort history, but it enables us to explain social change and the development of social institutions in an orderly and predictable way. We know what in general to expect of them under given conditions. Such is the nature of science in any field.

In dealing with this particular issue Professor R. E. Park remarks: "Teggart has stated the difference between history and the other sciences in one fine phrase. 'Science,' he says, 'deals with objects, entities, things, and their relations; history concerns itself with events.' Events happen, things do not. On the contrary they come into existence, change, and disappear in orderly ways, each in accordance with a rule that is characteristic of the class or type to which it belongs. . . . This is what is meant by describing things as natural phenomena. The nature of a thing is, in fact, just the rule or law by which it moves and changes. . . . Every science more or less creates its own objects out of events which are part of the common experience of mankind."⁸ The distinction between sociology and history is never quite as marked as in the statement just presented, but the characteristic emphasis of each of these disciplines seems truly placed.

Economics too, has its own particular orientation and its own ordered scheme of abstract concepts whereby economic processes are explained in mechanistic and predictable ways. These processes have to do with such objects or things as products, prices, wages, costs, profits, and interest rates. It explains the orderly and predictable ways in which the exchange of impersonal values takes place. The older economic mechanism operated most predictably where economic activities were little impeded by cultural factors. But in recent decades the economic mechanism has been increasingly subject to political pressure and the intrusion of more general types of social control. Within its own domain, economics has been through a disturbing movement known as institutional economics. This increasing impingement of social factors on economic processes has led to some redefinition of certain phases of the economic mechanism, but this redefinition is still largely a problem of the future. Since the sociologist is particularly concerned with cultural

⁷Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, 3 vols. (Tübingen, 1920-1). Weber's ideas are discussed in Talcott Parson's *Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937), part III.

⁸Gee (ed.), *Research in the Social Sciences*, pp. 3-4.

forms and the mechanisms of social control, and since economic institutions play such a dominant part in mobilizing men in new social situations, one can readily recognize the close interdependence of sociology and economics.

Political science is also closely related to sociology. Apparently stimulated by the secularization of social and political thinking in England, German writers in the early nineteenth century began to distinguish between the state (Staat) and society (Gesellschaft). Thus differentiated, society became the object of sociological science. Political theory developed in relation to the more clearly differentiated political phenomena, just as economic thought became scientific when its phenomena had become sufficiently distinguished from the activities of governments.⁹ Political scientists have as their objects of study those institutions in which resides ultimate authority to regulate the affairs between nations and within nations. However, it is obvious that these formal and often coercive types of social control rest back upon a whole series of social institutions relatively free from governmental supervision.

Usually those studying the state and other political bodies have concentrated upon their formal constitutions. More recently there has appeared a tendency for certain political scientists to study the "state as collective behavior within the framework of a continually changing social structure. This is the new political science of collective behavior and public opinion, and the functions of the state which (in the opinion of Professor Everett Hughes) is supplanting the older study of formal constitutions."¹⁰ Such tendencies will go far to align but not eliminate the specialized interests of the sociologist and the political scientist.

Perhaps closest to sociology in manner and matter is the sister science of cultural anthropology. In much of its emphasis it bears a close kinship to history. Anthropology, like archaeology and ethnology, originated to extend the field of history to pre-literate peoples and to supplement the historical documents of vanished civilizations. Its division of labour with sociology, economics, and political science lies in the fact that it has concentrated its attention on pre-literate peoples. For this purpose it has built up a conceptual scheme and research technique which give to it almost exclusive advantages in its particular field of interest. As a matter of fact, Comte's notion of making a study of society as a whole has been most completely realized by the anthropologists. The reason for this is clear: they deal usually with simple rather than complex societies. When cultural anthropologists study the more complex civilizations their methods and their concepts approach those

⁹Floyd House, *The Development of Sociology* (New York, 1936), pp. 102-3.

¹⁰R. E. Park (ed.), *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1939), p. 294.

of the sociologists, providing that their primitive cultural "hangover" does not prevent such a methodological readjustment. A hint of this handicap is to be found in the Lynds's study of Middletown. The introduction to this study is by an anthropologist. The Lynds, although not professional anthropologists, proceeded by implication to treat Middletown as if its social structure was akin to that of a pre-literate community. The result was that the public came into the possession of a book that cannot stand up under the critical appraisal of either the anthropologists or the sociologists. Perhaps that is why it became a best seller. Much more satisfactory from a sociological point of view are Redfield's *Chan Kom* and Miner's *St. Denis*.¹¹ Here the anthropologists have made methodological adjustments to problems removed, but not very far removed, from those faced in pre-literate communities.

Psychology may be divided into two main divisions, individual and social psychology. The former is closely integrated with the findings of physiology and supplements the latter in explaining the mechanisms of unconditioned responses to stimuli. Those who are associated in this approach to human behaviour think of psychology as a physical rather than a social science. Consequently, this branch of psychology is not directly involved in an analysis of the divisions of labour of the social sciences. Social psychology likewise has two lines of development. One is an attempt to explain social behaviour largely by means of the concepts of individual psychology adjusted somewhat to meet group behaviour situations. The work of Floyd Allport typifies this approach and his efforts have added little to the body of knowledge dealing with the social behaviour of man. That type of social psychology developed by such sociologists as W. I. Thomas, which explains social conditioning in the formation of attitudes and analyses institutional impacts in the development of personality, has been part of the general development of sociology. It is not usually considered a separate discipline but is a special subdivision of sociology brought into existence by those familiar with the whole field of sociology. In so far as psychologists, marginal to the field of sociology, employ methods that add significantly to an understanding of the nature of social behaviour the sociologists are sure to take full account of their findings. Perhaps in the case of the psycho-analysts they have accepted tentative conclusions with too little discrimination. There are no doubt many psychologists who do not fit into the classification presented above. Some of them attempt to be psychologists to psychologists and sociologists to sociologists. Their modes of pro-

¹¹The former (Washington, 1934) deals with an outlying community in Mexico and the latter (Chicago, 1939) is a study of an outlying community in the province of Quebec, Canada.

cedure are so superficially eclectic that their scientific contribution seems most meagre.

The scope and methods of sociology as a specialized social science. In terms of a general definition, sociology may be said to be the "Science of Collective Behaviour." More specifically stated, sociology is a study of groups, territorial and non-territorial (or otherwise classified). It studies institutions which constitute the more formal aspects of group life, but it also studies the social movements out of which institutions emerge as the final stage in their natural history. The sociologist does not submerge the individual person but studies him as a product of, and a functional unit in, group behaviour.

The field of sociology includes certain areas of life to which it seems to have some special claim. Here with some assurance may be mentioned the *family, ethnic groups, communities, regions as constellations of communities, and social institutions*. However, with respect to communities and regions the sociologist shares the field with other social scientists. No doubt there is much overlapping of the areas of life studied by the social sciences. This fact is relatively unimportant. The main thing which distinguishes the social sciences is not the area of life studied but the point of view or conceptual mechanism by means of which it is studied. For instance, the sociologist is being looked to as a specialist in the study of social institutions although many of these institutions seem to fall particularly within the fields of interest of other social sciences. In general, it may be said that the sociologist may be expected to make an important contribution to the social sciences through his methods of studying collective behaviour, involving social interaction and the forms of culture emerging therefrom. The acid test, after all, is the significant results produced by a given science using its particular methods.

It has been frequently stated that the sociologist studies groups and institutions as wholes. Put in this way his point of view appears vaguely comprehensive and ambiguous. The impression is left that sociology is a rallying point for the other social sciences. Certainly this is not the conception of sociology prevalent on the continent displaying its most extensive development—North America. The sociologists have developed certain concepts which enable them to explain types of social interaction in groups, the ways in which the activities of their members become concerted, the institutional structures which emerge, and the roles which their chief functionaries and other group members play in their collective existence. Such a conceptual approach limits sociologists to certain particular aspects of group life. Other social scientists study different phases of group activity in keeping with their interests and

methods. This point of view varies from that of Georg Simmel¹² who maintained that sociology studies the forms of socialization while other social sciences deal with the content of group life. Simmel's formal processes include subordination and superordination, competition, the different types of conflict, and accommodation. These and other processes are formative in every type of group and it is the task of sociologists to concentrate on their discovery and explanation. Many of Simmel's concepts have become part of the conceptual mechanism of sociologists but in general practice they retain the description of situations (content) which is related to and explained by means of Simmel's and other concepts. Similarly, other social sciences use conceptual forms and maintain a close interrelation between these forms and the content to which they give meaning. Thus each of the social sciences brings new understandings of those phases of groups and institutions which its interests and methods make possible. If, in a measure, sociologists are somewhat more expert in explaining social institutions it is because they have done more comparative study here and their findings have received general attention.

The point of view and specialized interests of sociology may be clarified further by describing in some detail a few typical situations. McKenzie in *The Metropolitan Community*¹³ limited himself primarily to a consideration of spatial and temporal patterns as applied to the city-dominated constellation of regions in the United States. In each physiographic region a major (or gateway) city emerges. The expanse of territory tributary to it depends upon its natural transportation advantages, the resources of its hinterland, and the stage reached in their exploitation. Its life-cycle of development links it in increasing intensity with a widening hinterland. If such a city has certain natural advantages in location and means of transportation, it tends to become the centre of a metropolitan region which extends beyond its original physiographic area. Meanwhile, the central city becomes increasingly the point of dominance about which its tributary hinterland develops its natural organization. Each of the region's subsidiary cities, towns, and village communities finds its more or less specialized place and function competitively in the intra-regional division of labour. The most active agents in differentiating the functions of subsidiary communities and integrating them with the centre of dominance are the highly specialized institutions to be found in the latter. In the main, all this takes place tentatively and selectively by means of the play of natural forces.

¹²N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925).

¹³One of the monographs in the series *Recent Trends in the United States* (New York, 1933).

These metropolitan regions in turn compete with each other with regard to position and function. In such a struggle between giants the destinies of a region's subsidiary communities are involved. The region competes as a unit with other regions through its gateway city. In this fashion the whole of North America (and other continents as well) is in the process of being organized into a constellation of metropolitan regions. Above all others in North America the cities of New York and Chicago have come to play the roles of super centres of dominance integrating about them in a natural organization all outlying regions. Obviously the patterns of regional organization and inter-regional integration have involved a series of major changes in the means of transportation and communication. Transportation has expanded beyond the waterways, to the steam and electric railroads, and still more recently to the use of the automobile and truck. The expansion in communication has been equally significant. Since McKenzie's emphasis was chiefly on spatial and temporal patterns of regions and their constituent communities, an extensive use was made of statistical information supplied by census bureau, cities, industrial, commercial, and other organizations.¹⁴ These statistical data were used in relation to concepts which guided their usage and gave meaning to the results obtained.

Very little was said about the relations of groups and persons at the level of social interaction. Such was not the purpose of McKenzie's research. The significance of his findings for social studies is clear in terms of certain assumptions. One is that the spatial position of regions, communities, groups, and institutions determines the direction and intensity of their social contacts. Another closely related assumption is that changes in the spatial and temporal patterns of distribution of human beings and their institutions precipitate social changes and indicate their direction. Scientists studying economic, political, and other social institutions must take full account of the clues to their problems which come from those utilizing the approach which McKenzie typifies.

A similar approach prevails in studying communities, particularly the larger cities. As a city increases in numbers its spacial pattern changes from centre to circumference. New additions to population through migration enter the interstitial areas vicinal to the central business district where they remain temporarily; some of them stay permanently. By a series of invasions the majority of these newcomers move into more

¹⁴The circulation of metropolitan daily newspapers was used as one of the indices marking the circumference of each metropolitan region. On the periphery appear papers from other metropolitan centres. There is some overlapping along this outer boundary where the circulation from no one metropolis is predominant.

desirable outer areas displacing the original dwellers, who move before them into still more desirable outer areas. While this is the main direction of population movements within the city, it is also apparent that there is an adverse selection of population to the interstitial areas (often called slums) vacated by those moving up the occupational and social ladder. This reverse movement includes those unadjusted socially and those who compete for a livelihood under a variety of handicaps. Still another movement of population comprises those who move to large and expensive apartment buildings near the centre of the city. As the city expands outward annexing new territorial units, it becomes differentiated into many types of subdivisions which are called natural areas. They are the unplanned results of the natural expansion of the city. Each natural area attracts to it population elements typically appropriate with respect to age, sex, occupation, race, and ethnic background. Such areas are characterized by their own forms of institutional growth. In fact they are physically differentiated culture areas which function in a specialized way and are thus interdependent. Some of these areas comprise industrial belts and the population elements segregated in their vicinity; others are mid-urban or suburban residential areas far removed from industrial plants; and finally there is the central business area which, in the expansion and natural organization of the city, plays a role similar to that played by the gateway city as a centre of dominance in its region.

This approach has prepared the way for making area, group, institutional, or personality studies. The facts of location in a community lead to certain hypotheses as to the characteristic social behaviour of the unit selected for study. Interstitial areas have within them the typical conditions which make for ganging and the legally defined delinquencies which are their natural outcome. The boy's struggle for status and security in such socially confused and unstable local areas seems to demand in very many instances the presence of a gang even though some of its activities seem to add to the boy's insecurity. In its natural history the gang may become a club eventually under political tutelage and its programme at least tacitly accepted by other groups in the community. In other instances the gang becomes a unit in the programme of a Settlement House or some similar local establishment. That gangs play a most important and perhaps essential role in the development of personality in nondescript areas has been clearly demonstrated by the studies of Thrasher and Shaw in Chicago and New York. Many other studies support their conclusions. Done in a still more specialized way was the study of *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas*.¹⁵ Proceeding with

¹⁵R. E. L. Faris and H. W. Dunham (Chicago, 1939).

certain conceptions as to the nature of personal organization and disorganization together with the conception of the city presented above, Faris and Dunham discovered that "Each of the chief types of mental disorder has a characteristic distribution with reference to the differentiated areas found within the large modern city. Each of the following psychoses has its highest rate of incidence in the indicated type of local community: (a) paranoid schizophrenia in the rooming-house districts of the city; (b) catatonic schizophrenia in the neighbourhoods of first immigrant settlement which have a high proportion of their population foreign-born or Negro who are the most recent newcomers to the city; (c) manic-depressive psychoses in areas with higher rentals; (d) alcoholic psychoses in rooming-house and in certain immigrant areas; (e) dementia paralytica in lodging and rooming-house districts and Negro communities; (f) senile psychoses and arteriosclerosis in districts with the lowest percentages of home-owners."¹⁶ Since the authors are sociologists they give emphasis to factors treated more or less casually by psychiatrists. One is the hypothesis that social situations which interrupt communication and produce isolation make for mental breakdown. This notion seems particularly persistent with regard to paranoid schizophrenia. Such brief reference to this study presents inadequately the ideas and methods involved. This is a borderline project and its findings have opened the way for new research projects for both psychiatrists and sociologists.

The manner in which immigrant groups from foreign lands, always alien in culture and sometimes divergent in race, have been incorporated into the cultural life of a new land has been a perennial sociological interest. Among the most important monographs dealing with the immigrant groups have been *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*,¹⁷ and *Old World Traits Transplanted*.¹⁸ Immigrants enter urban communities in interstitial areas where social resistance is low and where standards of living are in keeping with their initial competitive ability. Here they tend to segregate and support their own cultural institutions, including newspapers in their own language. Here they obtain social status and a sense of security which the strange new social world can hardly offer. They become a self-conscious ethnic group with aims and interests somewhat in conflict with those of their adopted country. Usually their occupations lie outside the "colony." Similarly their political, recreational, and other secular institutional participation bring them into contacts with native culture. This is particularly true in

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. x.

¹⁷W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki (New York, 1927).

¹⁸R. E. Park and H. A. Miller (New York, 1921).

the case of children of immigrants who attend the schools of the new community. In due course, by means of these contacts with the larger community, their own cultural institutions become transformed until they are like or similar to their "opposite numbers" in the environing community. When this process of transformation reaches a certain stage immigrants tend to move outward in the expanding urban community to areas of second, third, and possibly fourth settlement. Segregation, and institutional and personal self-consciousness, diminishes to the tentative vanishing point in the third and fourth areas of settlement. Certain qualifications need to be made. Groups marked by high racial visibility in colour and feature may never become fully assimilated. This does not mean that they do not wish such a result but that racial marks set limits to intercommunication with others. For this reason it has been truly said "that no negro has ever fully entered the white man's world." The reverse is equally true. Furthermore, the mobility of immigrants and their institutional instability in the new world may result in their personal disorganization, as many studies have made clear. Nevertheless, it is in the main true that the segregation of immigrant groups (this is never absolute in the city) retards assimilation but enables it to take place eventually with a minimum of personal disorganization.

My own study of immigrant groups especially in the Canadian West¹⁹ confirms in the main the life-cycle of immigrant adjustment through conflict, accommodation, and eventual assimilation just discussed. There are certain differences in the extent and nature of the contacts with the environing culture in rural areas. Work (for the most part), neighbour, religious, recreational, and school contacts are within the ethnic group when it occupies all the contiguous farmsteads in a rural community. Nevertheless, when new settlers press upon its community boundaries, when the railroad enters the heart of the community accompanied by new commercial, educational, and recreational establishments, the processes of accommodation and assimilation increase in tempo. These cultural changes in rural communities are not usually accompanied by status-seeking migrations to successive areas of settlement as in urban communities. They occur from within and, while the end results require two or more generations in the city, they require three or more generations in rural communities. In both they are natural and inevitable if racial visibility does not intervene.

These case studies illustrate in limited fashion the specialized approach of the sociologist. Space has not permitted the intrusion of technical considerations. It has been hinted that statistics must be

¹⁹*Ethnic Communities in Western Canada*, vol. VII ("Canadian Frontiers of Settlement," ed. by W. A. Mackintosh and W. L. G. Joerg, Toronto, 1938).

related to sociological concepts; otherwise, statistics in this field is just so much irresponsible commensuration. May I conclude this paper with one final suggestion. Sociology is not the basic subject for other social sciences; it is equally true that no other social science is considered basic for the beginner in sociology. The student is advised to begin with that social science which enlists his interest and add to his intellectual equipment from the other sciences as interest and opportunity permit.

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SOME OBSTACLES TO A SCIENTIFIC SOCIOLOGY

IT has become fashionable in recent years to bemoan the manner in which the social sciences lag behind the physical sciences. Few, however, of those who deplore the slowness of scientific advance in man's knowledge of himself, have any concrete suggestions to make towards increasing the speed of that advance, nor are they clear as to whether the lag is necessary and inevitable, or accidental and removable. The common opinion appears to be that the causes of the lag are entirely, or at least mainly, historical, residing in the fact that while the physical sciences started earlier and have by now advanced further, the social sciences began later, and are still, therefore, lagging behind. This explanation is at least implied in the frequent urging by editors and politicians that the social sciences should hurry to catch up with the physical sciences, or alternatively, that the physical sciences should slow down and wait for the social sciences to overtake them. Viewing the matter thus, as a simple foot-race between physical science and social science, with the latter handicapped only by a slow start, is not altogether desirable, since it appears to ignore certain difficulties involved in a scientific approach to human behaviour, which, while not entirely absent in physical science, are nevertheless easier to cope with when dealing with non-human material than when dealing with human subject-matter. It is with these difficulties that the present paper will be concerned.

The nature of these obstacles will perhaps be made a little clearer if we begin with a preliminary consideration of what a scientific sociology entails. There is no mystery about this. The programme for the new science was set forth clearly and in detail by the man who invented the word sociology, Auguste Comte. Many who read Comte nowadays profess themselves disappointed in him, they fail to find in his writing what they expect. This is not Comte's fault but their own. The student who goes to Comte expecting to find there panaceas of social reform, short-cuts to saving the world, neatly tabulated laws of society or even a body of reliable research fact, will not find any of these things. All that Comte contributed that has been of abiding value was a programme, the meticulous following of which was necessary, was in fact indispensable, if the desired result was to be achieved. The desired result was, in simple language, a scientific understanding of human behaviour. Certain Greeks may have announced 2,500 years earlier that the first duty of man was to know himself but in those 2,500 years nothing in particular had been done about it and Comte considered it time a start was made. He therefore worked out more clearly than any writer before or since the necessary steps which human thinking has to take if it really wants

a science of society. The platform so worked out contains a number of planks which can be summarized briefly. In considering each of these it is necessary to bear in mind that they are not necessarily good things to do or even necessary things to do, they are merely steps indispensable if a certain end is to be reached, namely, the investigation of human behaviour by the same approach as that used in the physical sciences. Comte's programme, that is to say, is not vulnerable on any other ground except the ground that it does not conform to the procedures of physical science. Criticisms of it on other grounds are simply irrelevant. Every step in his argument is prefaced by the implied condition—if we want a social science we must do so-and-so; unless we do it we cannot call our activities social science. There are five essential planks in the platform.

(1) Theory must come before practice; understanding of society before reform; pure social science before applied social science. The justification of this, as with all the others, is to be found in the experience of the physical sciences. In the case of every other science from astronomy to physiology, knowing has always preceded practical application, sometimes by hundreds of years. Gunpowder is the tritest of examples. The Chinese chemists knew it as a toy, as a curiosity, as a bit of academic knowledge centuries before European gunmen put it to practical use. And the same statement can be made and verified about practically every invention or discovery that the human race has ever made. If the physical sciences have got where they are today by concentrating on finding out things irrespective of what could be done with the things when found out, then the social sciences in turn have to follow the same procedure and postpone social action until they know more than they know at present about the mechanics of human society. Sociology, therefore, is to be distinguished from social welfare or social reform or social amelioration.

(2) The task, says Comte, of all men of science in our time should be to transfer to observation the predominance hitherto enjoyed in human studies by the imagination. This is the second necessary step and here the obstacles spring up on every side. Even today the struggle for observational social science has not yet been won, there are still to be found within the ranks of so-called sociologists some who hold firmly that observation of the type practised in the physical sciences is not possible, or if possible is of little value, in the social sciences. I will return to this point at length later in the paper. All that need be said at present is that Comte maintained that observation of the same type is possible both for the physical scientist and the social scientist and unless it is possible then a real social science cannot exist. On this plank

then, sociology must be observational not intuitive. It bases itself on empirical fact and is thus to be distinguished from philosophy.

(3) Thirdly, the aim of observation of human behaviour should be to achieve generalization. Unless a discipline is engaged in thus trying to classify its subject-matter and inductively establish the qualities pertaining to its classes, it is not science. It may be valid, it is frequently said, for example, that novelists know more about human behaviour than social scientists do; it does not matter for the present discussion whether this is true or not. Whatever a novelist may know, he is not generalizing but particularizing, and, since no physical scientist particularizes, what novelists do cannot possibly be called science.

(4) Fourthly, how is this generalization to be achieved in dealing with human beings? The physical scientist uses test tubes and microscopes and similar tools. Unable to use such instruments, is not the social scientist stopped permanently at the very start of his investigation? Of course he is not, since in physical science the method of experiment is no more important than a second method which is available for the social scientist, the method of comparison. The human race, fairly universally I think, cherishes a myth that every single individual human being is in some way unique, and if unique they are of course not comparable one with another. In certain respects every human individual is different from every other individual; but there are two comments to be made. One is that the factor of variation is not confined to human beings but holds throughout the physical and biological worlds. Every horse is different from every other horse. The second comment is that there are common characteristics to all human beings; human beings do not differ from each other in every possible respect. A man speaks English, for example, or belongs to the liberal party, or likes Bach, and these characteristics he shares with other people. His behaviour, therefore, is clearly comparable with the behaviour of others like him and the method of comparison is just as valid to establish the characteristics of all members of the liberal party or all lovers of Bach as it is valid to establish the characteristics of the red-crested goldfinch or the anopheles mosquito. Red-crested goldfinches or anopheles mosquitos almost certainly cherish the same illusion of individual uniqueness as humans do, but the cherishing of that belief by those creatures does not deter the ornithologist and the entomologist from comparing them and generalizing about them. Why then should it deter the social scientist from comparison and generalization about human beings? Sociology under the third and fourth heads is thus to be distinguished from poetry, from literature, and from traditional history, all of which are non-comparative and non-generalizing.

(5) Fifthly, proceeding by way of comparison to generalization, the social science Comte visualized should be concerned with establishing general laws of human behaviour. Much criticism, even from social scientists themselves has been heaped on Comte for the way he uses the word law. In many peoples' minds, a scientific law appears to mean some world-shaking, hitherto unheard of, awe-inspiring generalization. One wonders how and when the word law got this significance, it is certainly not what Comte meant by his use of the word law. He used it in the ordinary scientific sense to mean no more than a constant and invariable relation observed to exist between phenomena. Why this relation exists, or who or what has caused it to exist are questions man has no means of answering. First find your laws before speculating what put them there.

Comte's view of scientific sociology was that it should concern itself with seeking to understand phenomena in the social world by methods modelled upon those used in physical science. In the physical sciences at the time when Comte wrote and I think still today, despite the publicity recently given to the principle of uncertainty, the laws they are seeking are mechanical laws, and it was in order to stress the possibility of mechanical laws in social science that he carefully excluded from his whole system the word *cause*. "The true positive spirit," he said, "consists in substituting the study of the invariable laws of phenomena for the study of their so-called causes." His dislike of the word *cause* was due to its suggestion of a voluntary agent. Mill noted the same objection. "There is a spontaneous tendency," says Mill, "of the intellect to account for all cases of causation by attributing them to the intentional acts of voluntary agents like itself. This is the instinctive philosophy of the human mind in its earlier stage before it has become familiar with other invariable sequences than those between its own volitions and its voluntary acts. The strength of this tendency does not lie in argument but in its affinity to an obstinate tendency of the infancy of the human mind." In other words, just as a child hurt by a chair attributes the cause of his pain to the voluntary act of a free agent residing within the chair and personalizes the chair, so, as Comte spent a great deal of time in showing, there is a strong tendency among those who should know better to attribute the cause of human behaviour to the intentional actions of voluntary agents. In November, 1939, a Toronto morning paper, not in its editorial columns where one would not be surprised to find it, but in a news item, announced that tourist traffic from the United States to Canada had fallen off to such an extent since the war started that the only possible cause to which it could be attributed was deliberate acts of sabotage by enemy agents. This is

one of innumerable examples of the obstinate tendency of the infancy of the human mind mentioned by Mill. Here again it may be true that the causes of human action are voluntary agents, but as usual, Comte's reply is that the physical sciences do not need such concepts, therefore the social sciences modelled on the physical sciences do not need them either, if they can handle their subject-matter without them. Under this fifth head sociology is therefore to be distinguished from psychology, which is still seeking to explain human behaviour in terms of conscious volition despite the efforts of the Freudians and the Behaviourists to lift it from that metaphysical stage of development.

The programme then, for a scientific sociology is comprised in those five necessities, theory before practice, observation, comparison, generalization, and the establishment of mechanical sequences. Stated thus it may sound trite, things which every freshman knows, things certainly which every physical scientist knows. It may be trite, but if the programme is so clear, if it was enunciated 100 years ago and if it has been followed consistently in social science, where then are the results? Why has it not been more successful than it apparently has been? The answer to this question is basically that people may know it but they do not accept it, and it is with the reasons for that non-acceptance that I wish to deal in the rest of this paper. The programme is, I think, clear and sound. It still, as a programme, cannot be faulted. The results that to date have accrued from it are admittedly a little disappointing, a little slight. The fault lies, however, not in the programme but in the weak vessels who have to put it into practice. It may sound easy, experience has shown on the contrary that it is probably the hardest programme for human agents to follow that has ever been set before them. Every one of the five planks in the platform is in fact a narrow plank across a yawning gulf, which it is very much easier to slip from than to stick on. It is the tendencies to slip off, the temptations to lose one's balance on these planks, that are the obstacles to a scientific sociology. Let us then take the five points in the Comtian programme and consider the obstacles that particularly pertain to each of them.

Theory before practice. The obstacles here are well-known and need little elaboration. The sociologist, after all, is a member of a society and as such he is as conscious as the next man of the imperfections of that society. His researches into social conditions and social relationships give him certain insights into what are usually called social problems and he is not entirely without a conscience. The result is a distressing tendency for some sociologists to mix up scientific enquiry and social reform. There is, of course, a legitimate field of co-operation between

sociology and social amelioration, similar to that achieved, for example, between biology and general medical practice, but such co-operation must be between a research science on the one hand and a practical healing art on the other. Nothing is gained and something important is lost by attempting to combine the two activities in the same individuals. The emotional drives of social work, the hurly-burly of reformist movements, the propaganda inseparable from "doing something about it," supply an unsatisfactory atmosphere for social research. But the pressures on the sociologist to move from the latter into the former are strong and he needs more than his fair share of sales resistance to stay on the Comtian path, in this one, and perhaps the easiest, respect.

Observation. When we pass on to consider Comte's second plank, observation not imagination, we find even more formidable obstacles. The imagination is an awkward flower to pluck out root and branch, observation of human beings offers a strong temptation to perform that strange operation known as "putting ourselves in the other person's place." And how can this be done except by the use of the imagination? We come here to a problem that has worried all students of human behaviour, the problem of how we can know what causes other people to act as they do. I have no time to develop the problem in detail. Only two solutions have, in my opinion, been found. One is to part company with Comte and admit subjective impressions, intuitions, "in-feeling" as valid evidence for social science. The other is the solution achieved in a few quarters, notably by Durkheim, which is to renounce all interest in subjective factors and to define a social fact as something external to the individual. It follows from this that one must either fall off the Comtian tight-rope by renouncing observation or stay on the tight-rope by renouncing common sense. For Durkheim's view of social facts as things exterior to the individual is obviously a view which sounds nonsensical to the man in the street. To him a social fact is a piece of behaviour which he does because he feels like doing it and to him, the doer, the feeling is as real and as important as the observable behaviour. The observer can see the behaviour but he cannot observe the feeling. He can deny that the feeling is important or primary, thus renouncing common sense, or he can intuit that it is there and that it is important as a motivating agent, thus renouncing observation as his technique. It is not insignificant that Durkheim and his school are almost alone among sociologists, in having the temerity to take the former course, even at the price it entails. As Durkheim's solution of the thorny question of observational technique in sociology is crucial and as his work is not as well-known as it deserves, his handling of the problem merits a somewhat lengthy digression. The crux of the

whole argument is whether the human actor is a voluntary agent and if so how the observational social scientist is to deal with the will, which as an alleged cause for human action is not open to observational inspection. All social scientists have difficulty with this problem and most of them, especially those stemming from the nineteenth century liberal tradition, deal with it by adopting an uneasy dualistic position. This dualism runs through writers as apparently dissimilar as Ogburn, Mac-Iver, Lewis Morgan, Hobhouse, Park and Burgess. In so far as they are scientists they are looking for mechanical sequences. They want to find order, regularity, pattern; they want to reduce social phenomena to formulae. To achieve this requires a deterministic approach, no effect without a cause, similar effects are brought about by similar causes. So they proceed to certain generalizations. "The advance in human thinking," says Hobhouse, "is correlated with advances in scale, efficiency, mutuality and freedom in human aggregations." "The marginal man," says Park, "is a nucleus of new ideas." "All societies," says Morgan, "pass through similar stages of development." "Cultural change," says Ogburn, "lags behind technological change." "Privileged classes," say the Marxists, "never give up their privileges voluntarily." But this determinism, this attempt to reduce human behaviour to formulae, must not be carried too far. The free conscious individual, master of his fate and captain of his soul, must not be lost sight of. Two men committing suicide may look like similar effects but it is highly dangerous to attribute their acts to similar causes. A man committing suicide has the freedom not to commit suicide if he likes to use it. A marginal man need not be a nucleus of new ideas unless he wants to be. Cultural change need not lag behind technological change; it always does, but man is a free agent and if he were only a little less conservative, a little less mulish, cultural change would go hand in hand with technological change. Privileged classes never give up their privileges until they are blown up, but they could if they wanted to. Societies pass through similar stages, according to Morgan, but if those which had lagged had only used their will-power a little more, if they had only controlled their environment a little more aggressively, they all would have reached the level of Victorian England. So similarly Hobhouse. The agent of social development is man's reason, the obstacle is his baser nature.

This belief in two natures in man, his natural and his social nature, his individuality and his communality, his response to deterministic forces and the conscious use of his will, needs proof. Without proof it must remain an *a priori* assumption, and to students of Comte, at any rate, it is a little too similar to certain earlier beliefs to be accepted without proof. The two natures in man of the liberal

sociologists bear a suspicious resemblance to Rousseau's free savage and the slave in chains (social chains), as also to the good angels and bad devils of medieval thought. Sociology of this sort seems to have advanced little if at all upon theological or metaphysical stages of human thinking. There may be some merit in the new names, the dresses may be the dresses of *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* but the voices are still the old voices of good and evil; though it must be admitted that in Hobhouse, for example, or MacIver, a different functional relationship has been achieved between them than in theological systems. In the hands of these writers society is a good thing because it controls the nature of man, which by implication is a bad thing. When, however, the nature of a particular man prompts him to kick against society, and, by becoming a reformer or an uplifter or an innovator, to alter society, then he is doing a meritorious act and society's efforts to coerce or liquidate him are reprehensible. It is still the old struggle between God and the Devil, except that the two protagonists change places according to whether, on the one hand, we are considering society as an educating agency and on the other, considering it as a reactionary force resisting social change. Whichever is the good principle and whichever the bad, it still remains a dualism. It must remain not only a dualistic approach which is undesirable on the ground of economy of hypothesis but also a dualistic assumption unless it is capable of proof. Whether it is capable of proof is at present not known since nobody tries to prove it, everybody assumes it as a starting point. It is a favourite and usually unconscious assumption because it is so much in accordance with common sense, but its apparent agreement with common sense means nothing. The belief in a flat earth or the belief in witches were once in accordance with contemporary common sense but that did not prove that these things had any existence in fact. As Thurman Arnold says, "it is necessary to realize that what we call free will and emotion and reason are beliefs which influence conduct and not separate little universes of their own. The world from the point of view of reason and free will may be compared to a highly idealized portrait of an individual which flatters him and makes him proud. It is useful to hang on the wall, it is entirely useless as a basis for diagnosis." Now as a belief that influences conduct, free will can be treated like any other belief, the belief in witches, for example, which notoriously influenced the behaviour of our own ancestors, or the belief in the divine right of kings. If the belief in the free rational individual is of this sort it is purely cultural and as much a human artifact as a stone axe. Living as we do in a culture dominated by such a belief, we are apt to assume that it has a basis in reality, that, the free rational man is a necessary part of humanity, that freedom of

choice based on reason is a *sine qua non* of human behaviour. It may be or it may not be, as a methodological postulate it has no necessary superiority over the opposite postulate, namely, that the free rational individual is a myth. It is in taking this latter view as his starting point that Durkheim parts company with the liberal sociologists mentioned above. He solves the dualism by rejecting completely any interest in the rational individual part of the problem. As a follower of Comte, he took literally Comte's injunction to take nothing for granted. In place of the usual dualism he deliberately adopted a position in which the individual's will was of no importance whatever and he adopted this position not from malice or any desire to be different but for the following reasons. (a) There is no evidence that the individual is ever a voluntary agent in anything he does. The only possible proof is the feeling that individuals have that they are exercising their freedom of choice, and feelings, being subjective, give no basis for an objective science. Any sociological system based upon the freedom of the will, or the will as a motivating agent, is built upon a basis of subjectivity and can, therefore, have no claim to being scientific. (b) The aim of any science is to see its subject-matter from outside and to see it whole. This is only possible in social science by the scientist deliberately making the effort to see human behaviour as it would presumably look to somebody looking at it through a microscope or a telescope from another planet. If seen thus, Durkheim inferred that human behaviour would look like any other form of behaviour, a group of units all more or less alike, all performing similar movements, all reacting with each other to make regular patterns, but the behaviour visible to the observer is the subject-matter and the only subject-matter of social science. Springs of action alleged to exist inside the units, little machines called wills and reasons which made them go, are not visible to the scientific eye and are therefore irrelevant to the discussion. The scientist was, and had to be, always on the outside looking in, hence he defined his social facts as things which were external to the individual, in other words behaviours, and by this methodological trick he was able to remain on the Comtian path. It may, perhaps, be called an unworthy trick; the point to remember is that unless the trick is performed the sociologist finds himself off the Comtian path in the yawning gulf below.

Durkheim's attitude to the whole will controversy is not, therefore, a bigoted belief in a proved determinism, it is rather a consciously adopted point of view, deliberately taken up in order to make sociology an observational science. In effect, his position is this: "Everybody assumes the importance in human behaviour of voluntary motivation and free conscious choice, on that assumption social science has

today got nowhere, therefore for a change let us try the other alternative, ignore the voluntary acts, the feelings and the conscious reason alleged to be behind behaviour and let us confine ourselves to observable behaviour." With great courage he selected two fields of human action in which the will is commonly thought to be important, namely, suicide and religion, and demonstrated quite conclusively that his exterior type of approach reduced those phenomena to as much order as, if not more than, the voluntary approach had ever achieved. In fact, in the hands of his followers and students Durkheim's approach has proved extremely fruitful, not only in sociology itself, but in such related fields as jurisprudence, in the work of Duguit, and in child psychology in the work of Piaget.

One further point in this connection which can only be touched on briefly. There seems to exist in the physical sciences or among those physical scientists who have a passing interest in social science, such as Professor Hogben, a definite impression that all the social scientist need do to reduce his material to order is to adopt an extreme mechanistic position and ignore subjective factors entirely. This is taking a naïve view of the problem. One cannot ignore the existence of subjective factors, one has only to look at the human behaviour around him to see the part played by sentiments and values and norms of conduct. But because we acknowledge the existence of these things it does not follow that we are therefore being metaphysical or normative. The fact that sentiments exist does not mean they have to be studied sentimentally. To say that norms of conduct exist does not mean they are part of ultimate reality. The importance of Durkheim's contribution was that he found a middle way between the crass materialism of those physical and biological scientists who want to deny the existence of values because they cannot see them, and the mysticism of the philosophers which treats values as a metaphysical (literally meta-physical) level of reality, unapproachable by ordinary scientific methods. The Durkheim way is to admit that values exist, but to haul them out into the light of empirical research by treating them as human artifacts capable of study by the same methods, as, for example, the English language or the Roman Civil law. There is, I think, some ground for regarding Durkheim's approach as the sociological counterpart to the James-Lange theory of the emotions but space does not permit an exploration of such relationship.

It is not uninformative, moreover, to discover that quite independently of Durkheim certain empirical support for his approach has in recent years accumulated in two other quarters of the social research field. These two fields are referred to by Dr. Parsons in his essay in this volume:

they are the Freudian school of psychiatry and the so-called "functional" social anthropologists. Neither of these two groups of workers started with any particular philosophical assumptions, neither of them had any noticeable theoretical axes to grind at the beginning of their researches. Freud apparently had never heard of Durkheim; and the early social anthropologists, Rivers, for example, had only a very slight acquaintance with his work. Both groups started with a certain practical job to do—the Freudians to understand the behaviour of mentally unbalanced cases, the anthropologists to understand the behaviour of people of strange and esoteric parts of the world. Neither of the two groups could by any just use of words be called armchair theorists, both were under certain practical compulsions to make sense of certain human behaviours in a limited space of time. And both groups, as a result of their experiences with their peculiar subject-matters, arrive at one common conclusion at least, namely, that the average human being in any part of the world, has usually not the faintest idea why he does the things he does. I am far from accepting the whole body of Freudian doctrine, but one proposition that the school of Freud has proved conclusively, is the proposition that human motives are seldom if ever conscious, and that to ask the individual why he does a thing is to invite nothing more valuable than a stream of rationalization. And this conclusion emerged empirically from their investigations, it was something that had to be postulated to make sense of the facts of behaviour.

Similarly with the anthropological researches. Experience with native peoples has made anthropologists profoundly suspicious of the reality of the free, rational, conscious individual. Most native peoples are just as convinced as are contemporary Europeans that they are free conscious agents, able in all things to please themselves as to what they do, and having certain feelings of freedom and choice and individuality when they do them. But the anthropologist, being on the outside of the native culture and hence approaching objectivity a little more closely than most sociologists can achieve in our own culture, is very sceptical of whether the free conscious wills and choices do in fact make an iota of difference to the natives' behaviour. Whatever may be the theoretical position of the anthropologist, he finds himself inclined to treat the native's belief in his own free-will rather as he treats his belief in witches, as a cultural belief which is very necessary to the people but which has no basis in actual fact.

It is significant, I think, that it should be the psychiatrists and the anthropologists who have been forced by their material to be most sympathetic to the Durkheimian position. The subject-matters of both these disciplines—the behaviour of mentally abnormal people in

the first case, the behaviour of primitive people in the second—are obviously types of human action which are a little foreign to the observer, a little removed from his ordinary everyday experience, a little remote from him. In both cases the investigator is in the traditional position of the looker-on who sees most of the game. He cannot get away with easy explanations in terms of attitudes or impulses or choices which sound profound and mean nothing; since he does not know himself what goes on in the heads of his patients or his natives he has to be guided by what he sees and hears, not by what he intuits. In other words, of all sections of social research, the two fields in which the investigator has been forced, whether he liked it or not, by the nature of his material, to follow the Comtian precept and use observation instead of imagination, are Freudian psychiatry and social anthropology, and it is precisely the workers in those two fields more than any others who are most willing, as a result of their experience, to agree that the observational approach is just as possible and just as complete in the social sciences as it is in the physical sciences. Neither the Freudians nor the social anthropologists find it necessary to use intuitions, “in-feeling,” putting themselves in the other fellow’s place. Yet they have at least gone as far towards understanding their material and reducing it to formula as the liberal sociologists and the traditional psychologists.¹

Where, then, lies the obstacle? It becomes clear when the Freudians and the anthropologists suggest to those concerned with studying human behaviour in our own culture that they should use the same observational methods that have been found fruitful in the fields of psychiatry and anthropology. Immediately arise in furious opposition the traditional psychologists and the liberal sociologists; a most unholy alliance. Professor MacIver may, I think, be taken as typical of the liberal sociologists. The difference between physical science and social science, to MacIver, is that the physical scientist is on the outside of his subject-matter looking in, the social scientist is on the inside of his subject-matter looking out. This must be so, he argues because of the nature of the two materials. MacIver admits that in certain borderline cases observation from the outside is possible, the economists and the anthropologists and even Durkheim have been *not altogether unsuccessful* in objectively describing certain aspects of human behaviour, but they have never

¹Of course it may be argued that it is just because the Freudians deal with abnormal mental states and the anthropologists with primitive people that they have ceased to believe in the rational man: he can only be found among sane members of “civilized” society. If the anti-positivists want to use such an argument they are welcome to it, for most scientists it involves far too rigid a distinction between “normal” and “abnormal,” and between “primitive” and “civilized.”

succeeded in getting to grips with the really important things. All they can observe is what people do, they can never find out what people feel, and it is what people feel that is really important. This position of Professor MacIver is also, it appears, that of traditional psychology which even in this day and age has not yet begun to doubt that man is a rational creature, and is still busy with its questionnaires and its attitude scales, in total ignorance apparently of the fact that a man named Freud ever lived and demonstrated the importance of unconscious motives in human action. One is forced to the conclusion that both the liberal sociologists and the traditional psychologists are still under the impression that human societies came into existence as a result of a certain early peace conference at which the social contract was signed.

With regard to the second point in the Comtian programme, there are two obstacles which are constantly recurring. (a) The fairly plain fact that observation of human behaviour is by the nature of the case somewhat difficult to carry out, since the observer is so often himself a member of the group or groups which he wants to observe, and hence cannot see the wood for the trees; and (b) the equally plain fact that this inherent difficulty of observation causes some social scientists to grow pessimistic at an early stage and to conclude that because the feat is difficult it is therefore impossible. This group, after exploring a little way the road pointed out by Comte and Durkheim, find some of their own cherished beliefs a little shaken, such as for example, their belief that man is a rational creature. They therefore tend to become uneasy and turn aside from the strict observational road to the blind alley of intuition. This pessimistic attitude is responsible, more than any other single factor, for the slow progress of the social sciences, since the intuitive approach, which is the only alternative to the observational approach, always results in as many interpretations as there are interpreters. Social science can no more advance on an "I-feel-this-to-be-true" basis than the physical sciences can. The only solutions, then, are either to give up the effort and admit immediately that we are not willing to transfer to observation the predominance hitherto enjoyed in social studies by the imagination or to really attempt that transfer.

The followers of Durkheim, the Freudians, and the social anthropologists are all, however, on the unpopular side in the argument. The man in the street told that these groups claim to understand human behaviour without paying much attention to individual feelings or individual will, is not impressed. He is sure that his own behaviour is rational and voluntary and that his feelings are as important as his acts, if not more so. The current ideology of our own culture is the basic obstacle to being observational in social science.

We now turn to Comte's third and fourth planks, *comparison* and *generalization*. Much of what has already been said applies equally well to these two necessities, so our discussion of the obstacles to them can be treated much more briefly. Comparison involves picking out common characters in a group of items. In the case of human beings it involves picking out common characters in classes of human behaviour. Now the common characteristics of any group of human beings are the dull and boring characteristics of that group. It is the particularities, the idiosyncracies, the uniquenesses of human behaviour that are interesting; it is their likenesses that are dull. Compare the information in the *Canada Year Book*, for example, with *Gone With the Wind*, or if you object to *Gone With the Wind* as fiction, any biography of any "great man." The human race prefers its fairy stories, it is just bored by generalizing social science. This is unfortunate, and another obstacle to scientific sociology, both in research and in teaching. Students much prefer to do research into allegedly unique life-histories or the table talk of great men than to compile statistics about population changes, or the relative incidence of divorce among bank clerks and among taxi-drivers, but it is of the latter stuff and not of the former that social science has to be made. The obstacles on this level are not lessened by the fact that whereas sociology is compelled by its terms of reference to struggle against the weight of tradition and human interest, various other social disciplines, which shall be nameless, are still catering to the belief in witches by supplying popular demand with great man theories of history and unique individual theories of psychology. Once again sociology finds itself on the unpopular side of the fence. In insisting on observation it conflicts with common sense, by questioning the uniqueness of individuals, it conflicts both with popular taste and with tradition. Yet the only reason for questioning the uniqueness of the individual or of the historical event is because, if they are unique, it can see no way to compare them, and unless comparison is possible how can any social science exist?

Comparison is difficult at another level. Instead of comparing individuals it is often profitable to compare events, or situations, or societies. Let us imagine, for example, a comparison of the English, French, and Russian revolutions, or the rise of five or six new religious movements. The moment he begins to compare these groups of phenomena, the sociologist has to play fast and loose with the details. The fact that one revolution began on a Tuesday in the middle of June, the second on a Friday in October, and the third on a Sunday in February is, from the comparative point of view, irrelevant; so are the dates, so are the surnames and personal idiosyncracies of the main actors,

unless any of these things recurs. If all three revolutions began on a Tuesday in the middle of June, that fact might have sociological significance. One might then hazard the hypothesis that revolutions were seasonal phenomena. Those factors which do not recur, the sociologist rejects as unimportant for his purposes. This is contrary to the basis of academic history, which is firmly grounded on the proposition that we must know *all* the facts. So we must, but need we use them all, or give them all equal weighting? The historian clearly has to select from the reservoir of all the facts those which he, on a common-sense basis, considers most important. The sociologist, distrusting common sense as cultural and hence temporary, selects from the same reservoir on another basis, that of repetition. He thus achieves a comparative history by selecting as relevant, facts which recur, and ignoring facts which do not. But here again his efforts are resisted by the historian and the common-sense layman, both of whom look askance at such comparative studies and ask pointedly—does accident play no part in history? Accident undoubtedly does, just as it does in physics or in biology. Those sciences have an instrument, namely, the theory of probability for dealing with the accidental factor, and there seems no inherent reason why human beings should be any exception to the rules of probability. Accidents which cannot be brought within the probability theory are not accidents at all but miracles, and social science does not believe in miracles.

Finally we come to the last item in the Comtian programme, the question of *mechanical laws*. Most of what can be said under this head has been either said or implied already. Laws in our sense mean no more than constant observable relationships between phenomena, or in Karl Pearson's definition, a brief statement or formula which resumes the relationship between groups of facts. Kroeber's investigation of the cycles in the dimensions of the female evening dress or the Chicago propositions regarding the concentric zones of cities are examples of laws of this sort. A not unimposing number of such observable relationships between groups of social facts could be cited. The sociologist's list would not, I think, be as long as the economist's list of similar formulae, but a sociological list of some length does undoubtedly exist. Now it is a puzzling fact that many sociologists are for some strange reason apparently ashamed of these additions to human knowledge; they feel uneasy because many of these formulae refer to things already known before the sociologist demonstrated them. Such an attitude, which is of course no encouragement to other people to become interested in the subject, is due again to a misconception of the nature of science in general. The distinction so drawn between things known and things not known is a false distinction to draw, the valid distinction is between

things known and things reduced to formula, things vaguely seen as "hunches" and the same things proved by empirical research; for example, in a certain sense, all that Mendel said was that offspring resembled their parents. This surely had been noticed before Mendel. Actually what Mendel did was to reduce to a mechanical formula a fact that in a crude unformulated way was common knowledge before his time. Similarly with Darwinian evolution. Evolutionary ideas go back at least to the Romans and the Greeks, Darwin gave the vague idea exact expression. The value of taking vague ideas and reducing them to exact formulation resides in the fact that when so reduced there is no longer any argument about them; as long as they remain at an unformulated level arguments rage about them endlessly and human knowledge is not noticeably advanced. When, however, they are established on a research basis, argument ceases, they are no longer part of the sacred world but part of scientific knowledge and those who do not accept them are not taken seriously (there is still, I believe, a flat-earth society). One might expect that those hard-working scientists who have taken these matters out of the realm of speculation and hence out of the realm of emotion, would receive the congratulations of their colleagues, instead of which they are told that their formulae are unimportant, everybody always guessed that anyway. We are back here to the fallacy which I mentioned earlier, that current superstition that the discovery of a scientific law must be a cataclysmic event which, when it occurs, will shake the world. This in another form is the great man theory over again. In reality the history of physical science shows clearly that science progresses by the slow, careful accumulation of tiny facts, it is only in the newspapers and in the nationalistic school history books that human knowledge appears to move in any cataclysmic way.

In conclusion, the thesis of this paper may be summarized in a few main points. (a) A science of society can only be achieved by modelling its methods upon the procedures of the physical sciences. Unless this is done we shall never have a social science. We may have other social studies but as many of these have existed since Greek times without noticeably improving man's knowledge of himself they are not attractive as alternatives to social science. It is, I fear, a case of social science or no social knowledge at all. (b) The methods necessary to build a social science were set forth as a programme by Comte. The steps in the programme I have dealt with at length. (c) The feasibility of such a programme has been tested, notably by Durkheim, and has been found adequate. (d) Feasible as the programme is, the difficulties involved in following it are multitudinous, since almost every

step in it runs counter to the most cherished notions of human beings, especially human beings in our culture. These multitudinous difficulties can be reduced to one; the chief and indeed the only obstacle to a scientific sociology is modern man himself. Sociology has to be observational—man prefers to be intuitive. Sociology has to generalize—man prefers to particularize. Sociology wants to compare—man finds contrast much more interesting. The sociologist searches for mechanical sequences—man firmly believes in witches, whether he call them witches or wills or reason or instincts or impulses, they are always little machines inside himself which prompt him what to do. Sociologists see men as pretty much alike—man is firmly convinced of his own uniqueness. Sociologists want to know how society works before tinkering with the machinery—man loves tinkering with things he does not understand. All those activities which are necessary to sociology are as it were unnatural, untraditional, in a legitimate sense of the word, anti-social. Viewed in this light, the really surprising thing is not that sociology is advancing so slowly but that, despite these obstacles, there is any sociology at all.

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THE MOTIVATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

SPECIALIZATION is, without doubt, one of the most important factors in the development of modern science, since beyond a certain level of technicality it is possible, even with intensive application, only to master a limited sector of the total of human knowledge. But some modes of specialization are, at the same time, under certain circumstances, an impediment to the adequate treatment of some ranges of problems.

The principal reason for this limitation of the fruitfulness of at least some kinds of specialization lies in the fact that the specialized sciences involve a kind of abstraction. They constitute systematically organized bodies of knowledge, and their organization revolves about relatively definite and therefore limited conceptual schemes. They do not treat the concrete phenomena they study "in general" but only so far as they are directly relevant to the conceptual scheme which has become established in the science. In relation to certain limited ranges of problems and phenomena this is often adequate. But it is seldom, after such a conceptual scheme has become well worked out, that its abstractness does not sooner or later become a crucial source of difficulty in relation to some empirical problems. This is apt to be especially true on the peripheries of what has been the central field of interest of the science, in fields to which some of the broader implications of its conceptual scheme and its broader generalizations are applied, or in which the logically necessary premises of certain of these generalizations must be sought.

This has been notably the case with economics, precisely because, of all the sciences dealing with human behaviour in society, it was the earliest to develop a well-integrated conceptual scheme and even today has brought this aspect of its science to a higher level of formal perfection than has any other social discipline. More than a century ago, however, economists began to be interested in the broader implications of their system and of the facts it had succeeded in systematizing. Perhaps more than in any other direction these "speculations" have concentrated on the range of problems which have been involved in the idea of "laissez-faire," of the functioning of a total economic system of "free-enterprise" untrammelled by controls imposed from without and without important relations to elements of human action which played no explicit part in the conceptual armoury of economic theory.

Once the attention of the economist has extended to problems as broad as this, the problem of the motivation of economic activities, whether explicitly recognized or not, has inevitably become involved by implication. The equilibrating process of a free economy was a

matter of responsiveness to certain types of changes in the situation of action, to the prices, the supplies, and the conditions of demand for goods. The key individual in the system, the business man, was placed in a position where money calculations of profit and loss necessarily played a dominant part in the processes of adjustment, when they were analysed from the point of view of why the individual acted as he did. In a certain empirical sense it has seemed a wholly justifiable procedure to assume that he acted to maximize his "self-interest," interpreted as the financial returns of the enterprise, or more broadly, he could be trusted to prefer a higher financial return to a lower, a smaller financial loss to a greater.

From these apparently obvious facts it was easy to generalize that what kept the system going was the "rational pursuit of self-interest" on the part of all the individuals concerned, and to suppose that this formula constituted a sufficient key to a generalized theory of the motivation of human behaviour, at least in the economic and occupational spheres. It is important to note that this formula and the various interpretations that were put upon it was not the result of intensive technical economic observation and analysis in the sense in which the theory of value and of distribution have been, but of finding a plausible formula for filling a logical gap in the closure of a system. This gap had to be filled if a certain order of broad generalization were to be upheld. Such current doctrines, outside the strictly economic sphere, as psychological hedonism, seemed to support this formula and to increase confidence in the universal applicability of the economic conceptual scheme.

In the meantime a good deal of work has been going on in other fields of the study of human behaviour which has for the most part been rather rigidly insulated from the work of economists, but which bears on the problem of motivation, in ways which are applicable, among others, to the economic sphere. This has been true of social anthropology, and of parts of sociology and of psychology. Though there have been some notable examples of individual writers who, like Pareto, Durkheim, and Max Weber, have brought out various aspects of the interrelations of these fields with the problems of economics directly,¹ on the whole they seem to have remained insulated, so that it can scarcely be said that a well-rounded analysis of the problem, which takes account of the knowledge available on both sides, is, even in outline, well established as the common property of the social sciences. An

¹See the author's *Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937) for an analysis of this aspect of the work of these men.

attempt to present the outline of such an analysis is the principal object of the present paper.

On the economic side the impression has been wide-spread that a predominantly "self-interested" or "egoistic" theory of the motivation of economic activities was a logical necessity of economic theory. It can be said with confidence that careful analysis of the methodological status of economic theory as an analytical scheme demonstrates conclusively that this is not the case. There are, to be sure, certain necessary assumptions on this level. They are, I think, two. On the one hand, economic analysis is empirically significant only in so far as there is scope for a certain kind of "rationality" of action, for the weighing of advantages and disadvantages, of "utility" and "cost," with a view to maximizing the difference between them. In so far, for instance, as behaviour is purely instinctive or traditional it is not susceptible of such analysis. On the other hand, its significance rests on there being an appreciable scope for the treatment of things and other people, that is of resources, in a "utilitarian" spirit, that is, within limits, as morally and emotionally neutral means to the ends of economic activity rather than only as ends in themselves. In both respects there is probably considerable variation between individuals and between societies.

But this does not necessarily have anything to do with "egoism" in the usual sense. It has already been pointed out that the immediate goal of economic action in a market economy is the maximization of net money advantages or more generally of the difference between utility and cost. Choices, so far as they are, in the immediate sense "economically motivated" are, in the first instance, oriented to this immediate goal. It certainly is not legitimate to assume that this immediate goal is a simple and direct expression of the ultimate motivational forces of human behaviour. On the contrary, to a large extent its pursuit is probably compatible with a considerable range of variation in more ultimate motivations. Indeed, it will be the principal thesis of the subsequent analysis that "economic motivation" is not a category of motivation on the deeper level at all, but is rather a point at which many different motives may be brought to bear on a certain type of situation. Its remarkable constancy and generality is not a result of a corresponding uniformity in "human nature" such as egoism or hedonism, but of certain features of the structure of social systems of action which, however, are not entirely constant but subject to institutional variation.

The theoretical analysis of economics is abstract, probably in several different senses. This is crucial to the present argument because it is precisely within the area of its "constant" data or assumptions that the problems of the present discussion arise. To describe the kind of ab-

stractness which is relevant here, perhaps the best starting point is a formula which has been much discussed in economics, but which can be given a much more specific meaning in modern sociological terms than it has generally had in economic discussions. It is that economic activity takes place within the "institutional" framework of a society; economic behaviour is concretely a phase of institutional behaviour.

Institutions, or institutional patterns, in the terms which will be employed here, are a principal aspect of what is, in a generalized sense, the social structure. They are *normative* patterns which define what are felt to be, in the given society, proper, legitimate, or expected modes of action or of social relationship. Among the various types of normative patterns which govern action there are two primary criteria which distinguish those of institutional significance. In the first place, they are patterns which are supported by common moral sentiments; conformity with them is not only a matter of expediency, but of moral duty. In the second place, they are not "utopian" patterns which, however highly desirable they may be regarded, are not lived up to except by a few, or by others in exceptional circumstances. Thus the extreme altruism of the Sermon on the Mount or extreme heroism are very widely approved but the ordinary individual is not *expected* to live up to them. When, on the other hand, a pattern is institutionalized, conformity with it is part of the legitimate expectations of the society, and of the individual himself. The typical reaction to infraction of an institutional rule is moral indignation of the sort which involves a feeling of being "let down." A person in a fiduciary position who embezzles funds, or a soldier who deserts are not doing what others feel they have a *right* to expect them to do.

Institutional patterns in this sense are part of the social structure in that, so far as the patterns are effectively institutionalized, action in social relationships is not random, but is guided and canalized by the requirements of the institutional patterns. So far as they are mandatory they in a sense directly "determine" action, otherwise they set limits beyond which variation is not permissible and sets up corrective forces.

Seen from this point of view, institutional structure is a mode of the "integration" of the actions of the component individuals. There are, it may be suggested, three principal ways in which it is functionally necessary that such a social system should be integrated if it is to remain stable and avoid internal conflicts which would be fatal to it. In the first place, the different possible modes of action and of relationship become differentiated. Some are socially acceptable and approved, others reprehensible and disapproved or even directly prohibited. But in any case this system of differentiated actions and relationships needs

to be organized. Stability is possible only if within limits people do the right thing at the right time and place. It is furthermore exceedingly important that others should know what to expect of a given individual. Thus in all societies we find institutional definitions of *roles*, of the things given people are expected to do in different contexts and relationships. Each individual usually has a number of different roles, but the combinations of different roles vary with different "social types" of individuals.

Secondly, it is inherent in the nature of society that some individuals should be in a position to exercise influence over others. Again it is necessary that there should be a differentiation between those modes of influence which are held permissible or desirable, and those which should be discouraged or even forbidden. Where the lines will be drawn will differ with the social roles of the persons concerned. The compulsion exercised by police officers will not be permitted to private individuals, for instance. Certain modes of influencing others, often regardless of the willingness of the others to be influenced, are often necessary to the performance of certain roles. Where such modes of influence are institutionally legitimized they may be called "authority." On the other hand, it is often socially necessary or desirable that some or all individuals should be protected from modes of influence which others would otherwise be in a position to exert. Such institutionalized protection against undesirable or unwanted influence may be called "rights." An institutionalized structure of authority and rights is a feature of every integrated social system.²

Finally, action generally is teleologically oriented to the attainment of goals and to conformity with norms. It is inherent in its structure that acts, qualities, achievements, etc. should be valued. It makes a difference on a scale of evaluation what a person is and what he does. This necessity of evaluation implies in turn the necessity of ranking, in the first place, qualities and achievements which are directly comparable, thus, if physical strength is valued, persons will in so far be ranked in order of their physical strength. Secondly, this means that persons, as such, will be evaluated, and that where a plurality of persons are involved, they will, however roughly, be ranked. It is of crucial importance that the standards of ranking and their modes of application should, in the same social system, be relatively well integrated. This third aspect of institutional structure, then, is *stratification*. Every social system will have an institutionalized scale of stratification by which the different individuals in the system are ranked.

This institutional structure is found in social relationships generally

²Whether they are legally enforceable is secondary for present purposes.

and is as important in the sphere of economic activities as in any other. Every function at all well established in the economic division of labour comes to involve institutionally defined roles such as those of "banker," "business executive," "craftsman," "farmer," or what not. In connection with such a role there is a pattern of institutionally defined expectations, both positive and negative. Certain of these economic roles involve institutional authority such as that of an employer in the role of supervisor over his workers. Again, in various respects, persons in economic roles are subject to the authority of others, notably of public officials in matters of taxation, labour legislation, and many other fields. They are institutionally expected to obey and usually recognize this authority. Persons in economic roles, further, enjoy certain institutionally protected rights, notably those we sum up as the institution of property, and in turn are institutionally expected to respect certain rights of others, to refrain, for instance, from coercing others or perpetrating fraud upon them. Finally, each of them has a place in the system of stratification of the community. By virtue of his occupation and his status in it, of his income, of his "reputation," and various other things, he is ranked high or low as the case may be.

So far an institutional structure has been described as an "objective" entity which as such would seem to have little to do with motivation. The terms in which it has been described, however, clearly imply a very close relation. Such a structure is, indeed, essentially a relatively stable mode of the organization of human activities, and of the motivational forces underlying them. Any considerable alteration in the latter or in their mutual relations would greatly alter it.

When we turn to the subjective side it turns out that one principal set of elements consists in a system of moral sentiments. Institutional patterns depend, for their maintenance in force, on the support of the moral sentiments of the majority of the members of the society. These sentiments are above all manifested in the reaction of spontaneous moral indignation when another seriously violates an institutional pattern. It may indeed be suggested that punishment and sanctions are to a considerable extent important as expressions of these sentiments, and as symbolizing their significance. The corresponding reaction to violation on the actor's own part is a feeling of guilt or shame which, it is important to note, may often be largely repressed. On the positive side the corresponding phenomenon is the sense of obligation. The well integrated personality feels an obligation to live up to expectations in his variously defined roles, to be a "good boy," to be a "good student," an "efficient worker," and so on. He similarly has and feels obligations to respect legitimate authority in others, and to exercise it properly in his own case.

He is obligated to respect the rights of others, and on occasion it may be a positive obligation from moral motives to insist on respect for his own rights. Finally, he is obligated to recognize the status of others with respect to stratification, especially, but by no means wholly, of those superior to himself. The element of obligation in this sense is properly treated as "disinterested." It is a matter of "identification" with a generalized pattern, conformity with which is "right." Within comparatively wide limits his personal interests in the matter in other respects are irrelevant.

The prevailing evidence is that the deeper moral sentiments are inculcated in early childhood and are deeply built into the structure of personality itself. They are, in the deeper senses, beyond the range of conscious decision and control, except perhaps, in certain critical situations, and even when consciously repudiated, still continue to exert their influence through repressed guilt feelings and the like. In situations of strain these may well come to be in radical opposition to the self-interested impulses of the actor; he is the victim of difficult conflicts and problems of conscience. But there is evidence of a strong tendency, the better people are integrated with an institutional system, for these moral sentiments to be closely integrated with the self-interested elements to which we must now turn.

If the above analysis is correct, the fact that concretely economic activities take place in a framework of institutional patterns would imply that, typically, such disinterested elements of motivation play a role in the determination of their course. This is not in the least incompatible with the strict requirements of economic theory for that requires only that, as between certain alternatives, choice will be made in such a way as to minimize net money advantages to the actor, or to the social unit on behalf of which he acts. Both in the ultimate goals to which the proceeds will be applied, and in the choice of means there is no reason why disinterested moral sentiments should not be involved. But there is equally no reason why, on a comparable level, elements of self-interest should not be involved also. Indeed, the distinction is not one of classes of concrete motives, but of types of element in concrete motives. In the usual case these elements are intimately intertwined.

There is, furthermore, no general reason to assume that "self-interest" is a simple and obvious thing. On the contrary, it appears to be a distinctly complex phenomenon, and probably the analytical distinctions to be made respecting it are relative to the level of analysis undertaken, hence to the problems in hand. Only such distinctions will here be made as seem essential to the main outline of a theory of motivation of economic activity.

The most general term which can be applied to this phase of motivation is, perhaps, "satisfaction." There is an interest in things and modes of behaviour which yields satisfactions. One of the important components of this is undoubtedly "self-respect." So far, that is, as moral norms are genuinely built into the structure of personality the individual's own state of satisfaction is dependent on the extent to which he lives up to them. This is above all true with respect to the standards of his various roles, particularly in our context, the occupational role, and to the place he feels he "deserves" in the scale of stratification.

Closely related to self-respect, indeed in a sense its complement, is what may, following W. I. Thomas, be called "recognition." To have recognition in this sense is to be the object of moral respect on the part of others whose opinion is valued. To be approved of, admired, or even envied, are flattering and satisfying to any ego. As the works of Mead and others have shown, the relations of self-respect and recognition are extremely intimate and reciprocally related. The loss of respect on the part of those from whom it is expected is one of the severest possible blows to the state of satisfaction of the individual.

Third, there is the element which lies closest to the pattern of economic analysis, the fact that we have an interest in a given complex of activities or relationships for "what we can get out of them." That is, they are, to a certain extent, treated as a means to something altogether outside themselves. This is the classic pattern for the interpretation of the significance of money returns. The pattern involves the assumption that there are certain "wants" which exist altogether independently of the activities by which the means to satisfy them are acquired. Though unjustified as a general interpretation of economic motivation, such a dissociation does, on a relative level, exist and is of considerable importance. In this, as in many other respects, the prevailing economic scheme is not simply wrong, but has not been properly related to other elements.

Fourth, there is another element which has played a prominent part in the history of economic thought, "pleasure." This may be conceived as a relatively specific feeling-tone which is subject to interpretation as a manifestation primarily of particular organic states. Of course pleasure may be one of the "ulterior" ends to which economic activities are means—it is certainly not, as the hedonists would have it, the sole one. It may also be present, and often is, in the actual activities performed in the pursuance of economically significant roles; most of us actually enjoy a good deal of our work. One fact, however, is of crucial significance. Pleasure, or its sources, is not, as the classical hedonists assumed, a biologically given constant, but is a function of the *total* personal equilibrium of the individual. It does seem to have a particularly close connection with organic states, but undoubtedly these in turn are greatly

influenced by the emotional states of the individual, and through these, by the total complex of his social relationships and situation. Hence pleasure, as an element of motivation, can only in a highly relative sense be treated as an independent focus of the orientation of action.

Finally, there is still a fifth element in "satisfactions" which, though perhaps less directly associated with the economic field than the others, should be mentioned. Men have attitudes of "affection" toward other human beings, and somewhat similar attitudes toward certain kinds of inanimate objects. The "aesthetic emotion" very likely contains in this sense a component which is distinguishable from pleasure, by which one, for instance, can say "I am exceedingly fond of that picture." In the case of other human beings, however, this affectional attitude is often reciprocal and we may speak of a genuine egoistic interest in the affectional "response" of another, again to use Thomas's term. It is true that the institutional patterns governing economic relationships are, in our society, largely "impersonal" in a sense which excludes response from direct institutional sanction. It does, however, come in in at least two important ways. On the one hand, it is very prominent in the uses to which the proceeds of economic activity are put, constituting for one thing a prominent element of family relationships. On the other hand, on a non-institutional level, response relationships are often of great importance, concretely in the occupational situation and motivation of individuals. Thus a very important motive in doing "good work" may be its bearing on friendship with certain occupational associates.

In all these respects there is a further fundamental aspect of the motivational significance of a great many things which the traditional economic analysis does not take into account. Many of the most important relations of things to action lie in the fact that they are associated with one or more of these elements as symbols. An excellent example is that of money income. From the point of view of valuation it is probably fair to say that the most fundamental basis of ranking and status in the economic world is occupational achievement and the underlying ability. But for a variety of reasons it is difficult to judge people directly in these terms alone. Above all, in view of the technical heterogeneity of achievements it is difficult to compare achievements in different fields. But in a business economy it is almost inevitable that to a large extent money earnings should come to be accepted as a measure of such achievements and hence money income is, to a large extent, effectually accepted as a symbol of occupational status. It is hence of great importance in the context of recognition.

Once the institutional pattern in question comes to be thoroughly established, though it continues to be in part dependent on the moral

sentiments underlying it, its maintenance by no means depends exclusively on these. There is, rather, a process of complex interaction on two levels at once, on the one hand between the disinterested and self-interested elements in the motivation of any given individual, on the other between the different individuals. The first aspect of interaction has already been outlined in discussing the content of the concept "self-interest." The general tendency of the second process, so far as the institutional system is integrated, is to reinforce conformity with the main institutional patterns through mechanisms which work out in such a way that, in his relations with others, the self-interest of any one individual is promoted by adhering to the institutional patterns.

It has already been pointed out that the normal reaction of a well-integrated individual to an infraction of an institutional rule is one of moral indignation. The effect of this is to change an otherwise or potentially favourable attitude toward the individual in question to an unfavourable one. There are, of course, many different variations of degree between the various possible effects of this. It may be a matter simply of lessened willingness to "co-operate" in the achievement of the first person's ends in ways in which the second is useful or necessary as a means. In the more extreme instances it may involve positive obstruction of his activities. It will certainly mean a lessening of the respect which is involved in recognition; again in the more extreme cases it may mean positive action to belittle and run down the offender's reputation and standing, dismissal from positions, withdrawal of honours, and the like.

It would be unusual, except in very extreme cases for direct pleasures to be involved, certainly in a physical sense. But in various subtle ways the disapproval of others, especially when it is intense enough to be translated into direct action, affects the sources of pleasure to which an individual has become accustomed. Finally, so far as people on whom he counts for response share the moral sentiments he has offended, this response, notably in "friendship," is likely to be lessened. In the extreme case again a friendly attitude may be transformed into a directly unfriendly one, indeed on occasion into bitter hatred.

Thus, even without taking account of the possible internal conflicts which violation of his own moral sentiments brings about, it can be seen that a very substantial component of the individual's own self-interest is directly dependent on his enjoying the favourable attitudes of others with whom he comes into contact in his situation. Even if he continues to "make money" as before his loss from the point of view particularly of recognition and respect may be of crucial importance, and in the long run probably his income is (the better integrated the situation the more

so) bound up with his maintenance of good relations with others in this sense.

It is now possible to bring out what is, in many respects, the most crucial point of the whole analysis. It is true that it has been argued that it is impossible to treat the self-interested elements of human motivation as alone decisive in influencing behaviour, in the economic sphere or any other. But it is not this thesis which constitutes the most radical departure from a kind of common sense view which is widely accepted among economists, as among other normal human beings. It is rather that the *content* of self-interested motivation itself, the specific objects of human "interests," cannot, for the purposes of any broad level of generalization in social science, be treated as a constant. That is, not only must the fact that people have interests be taken into account in explaining their behaviour, but the fact that there are variations in their specific content as well. And these variations cannot, as economic theory has tended to do, be treated at random relative to the *social* structure, including in a very important sense that of the economic sphere of society itself. For it is precisely around social institutions that, to a very large extent, the content of self-interest is organized. Indeed, this organization of what are the otherwise, within broad limits, almost random potentialities of the self-interested tendencies of human action into a coherent system, may be said, in broad terms, to be one of the most important functions of institutions. Without it, society could scarcely be an order, in the sense in which we know it, at all. It thus depends on the standards according to which recognition is accorded, on the specific lines of action to which pleasure has become attached, on what have come to be generally accepted symbols of prestige and status, what, in concrete terms, will be the *direction* taken by self-interested activity and hence what its social consequences will be. Again this applies to what are ordinarily thought of as "economic" interests just as it does to any others.

The most convincing evidence in support of this thesis is to be derived from a broad comparative study of different institutional structures. Such a comparative study can go far to explain why, for instance, such a large proportion of Indian Brahmans have been interested in certain kinds of mystical and ascetic religious behaviour, why so many of the upper classes in China have devoted themselves to education in the Confucian classics looking toward an official career as a Mandarin, or why the members of European aristocracies have looked down upon "trade" and been concerned, if they have followed an occupational career at all, so much with the armed forces of the state, which have counted specifically as "gentlemen's" occupations. There is, unfortunately, no space to go into this evidence.

It may be useful, however, to cite one conspicuous example from our own society, that of the difference between business and the learned professions. There are important differences between the institutional patterns governing these two sectors of the higher part of our occupational sphere, and perhaps the most conspicuous of these touches precisely the question of self-interest. The commonest formula in terms of which the difference is popularly expressed is the distinction between "professionalism" and "commercialism." Now in the immediately obvious sense the essence of professionalism consists in a series of limitations on the aggressive pursuit of self-interest. Thus medical men are forbidden, in the codes of medical ethics, to advertise their services. They are expected, in any individual case, to treat a patient regardless of the probability that he will pay, that he is a good "credit risk." They are forbidden to enter into direct and explicit price competition with other physicians, to urge patients to come to them on the ground that they will provide the same service at a cheaper rate. It is true that, in all this, infraction of the professional code would, in general, permit the physician to reap an immediate financial advantage which adherence to the code deprives him of. But it does not follow that, in adhering to the code as well as they do, medical men are actually acting contrary to their self-interest in a sense in which business men habitually do not.

On the contrary, the evidence which has been accumulated in the course of a study of medical practice³ points to a quite different conclusion, which is that a principal component of the difference is a difference on the level of the institutional pattern, rather than, as is usually thought, a difference of typical motivation.⁴ In both cases the self-interest of the typical individual is on the whole harnessed to keeping the institutional code which is dominant in his own occupational sphere. It is true that by advertising, by refusing to treat indigent patients, or in certain circumstances by cutting prices, the individual physician could reap an immediate financial advantage. But it is doubtful whether, where the institutional structure is working at all well, it is from a broader point of view to his self-interest to do so. For this would provoke a reaction, in the first instance among his professional colleagues,

³As yet unpublished.

⁴This is by no means meant to imply that there are no differences of typical motivation. Such differences could be accounted for either on the ground that the two occupational groups operated selectively on personality types within the population, or that they influenced the motivation of people in them. The essential point is that the treatment of the concrete differences of behaviour as direct manifestations of differences of ultimate motivation alone is clearly illegitimate in that it fails to take account of the institutional factor. It is quite possible that the institutionalization of financial self-interest does, however, tend to cultivate a kind of egoism and aggressiveness in the typical business man which is less likely to be created in a professional environment.

secondarily among the public, which would be injurious to his professional standing. If he persisted in such practices his professional status would suffer, and in all probability various more tangible advantages, such as habitual recommendations of patients by other physicians, would disappear or be greatly lessened. It is not suggested that the average physician thinks of it in these terms; for the most part it probably never occurs to him that he might consider deviating from the code. But the underlying control mechanisms are present none the less.

In business the "definition of the situation" is quite different. Advertising, credit rating, and price competition are, for the most part, institutionally accepted and approved practices. It is not only not considered reprehensible to engage in them, but it is part of the institutional definition of the role of the "good" business man to do so.

It is true that in the professions money income is one of the important symbols of high professional standing. The more successful physicians both charge higher fees and receive larger total incomes. But there is still an important difference. There are in the first place important exceptions to the regularity of this relationship. There is probably nothing in the business world to correspond to the very high professional prestige of the "full time" staff of the most eminent medical schools, even though their average income is markedly lower than that of the comparably distinguished men in private practice. There are probably very few resident physicians or surgeons in the teaching hospitals associated with such institutions as the Harvard Medical School who would refuse an opportunity to go on the full-time staff in order to enter private practice, even though the latter promised much larger financial returns.

But, beyond this, in business money returns are not only a symbol of status, they are to a considerable extent a direct measure of the success of business activities, indeed, in view of the extreme heterogeneity of the technical content of these, the only common measure. This situation is, however, being rapidly modified by the large-scale corporate organization of the business world. There "profit" applies only to the firm as a whole, for the individual it is primarily his office and his salary which count. This development is greatly narrowing the gap, in these respects, between business and the professions.⁵

It is thus suggested that the much talked of "acquisitiveness" of a capitalistic economic system is not primarily, or even to any very large extent a matter of the peculiar incidence of self-interested elements in the motivation of the typical individual, but of a peculiar institutional structure which has grown up in the Western world. There is reason

⁵This development involves a major change in the institutional setting of the problem of self-interest. Even though, as will be noted presently, in individual market com-

to believe that the situation with respect to motivation is a great deal more similar in this area to that in other parts of our occupational structure which are not marked by this kind of acquisitiveness than is generally supposed.

Our occupational structure is above all one in which status is accorded, to a high degree, on the basis of achievement, and of the abilities which promise achievement, in a specialized function or group of functions. One may, then, perhaps say that the whole occupational sphere is dominated by a single fundamental goal, that of "success." The content of this common goal will, of course, vary with the specific character of the functional role. But whatever this may be, it will involve both interested and disinterested elements. On the disinterested side will be above all two components, a disinterested devotion to "good work" which must be defined according to the relevant technical criteria, and a disinterested acceptance of the moral patterns which govern this activity with respect to such matters as respecting the rights of others. On the side of self-interest in most cases the dominant interest is probably that in recognition, in high standing in the individual's occupational group. This will be sought both directly and through various more or less indirect symbols of status, among which money income occupies a prominent place. Part of the prominence of its place is undoubtedly a result of the fact that a business economy has become institutionalized in our society.⁶

The traditional doctrine of economics that action in a business economy was primarily motivated by the "rational pursuit of self-interest" has been shown, in part to be wrong, in part to cover up a complexity of elements and their relationships of which the people who have used this formulation have for the most part been unaware. It may be hoped that the above exposition has, schematic as it has been, laid the foundations,

petition, profit is rather an institutionally defined goal than a motive, it makes a considerable difference whether, as the older economists assumed, the consequences of a business decision will react directly on the personal pocket-book of the person making the decision, or only on that of the organization on behalf of which he decides. The position of the business executive thus becomes to a very large extent a fiduciary position. There is little difference between the considerations which will influence the manager of an investment trust, especially of a conservative type, and the treasurer of a university or a hospital, even though one is engaged in profit-making business, the other is a trustee of an "altruistic" foundation. In both cases the individual concerned has certain obligations and responsibilities, and unless the situation is badly integrated institutionally, it will on the whole, though perhaps in somewhat different ways, be to his self-interest to live up to them relatively well.

⁶To avoid all possible misunderstanding it may be noted again that no claim is made that there are no important differences of motivation, above all that the business situation may not cultivate certain types of "mercenary" orientation. The sole important purpose of the present argument is to show that the older type of discussion which

in broad outline, of an account of the matter which will both do better justice to some of the empirical problems which confront the economist and will enable him to co-operate more fruitfully with the neighbouring sciences of human behaviour instead of, as has been too much the tendency in the past, insulating himself from them in a kind of hermetically sealed, closed system of his own.

It would, however, be unfortunate to give the impression that this account is by any means a complete one, suitable for all purposes. In closing, a further aspect of the problem which is of great empirical importance, but could not receive full discussion in the space available, may be briefly mentioned. The above analysis is couched in terms of the conception of an institutionally integrated social system. It is only in such a case that the essential identity of the direction in which the disinterested and the self-interested elements of motivation impel human action, of which so much has been made in this discussion, holds. Actual social systems are, in this sense, integrated to widely varying degrees, in some cases the integrated type is a fair approximation to reality, in others it is very wide of the mark. But even in developing a theory which is more adequate to the latter type of situation, the integrated type is a most important analytical starting point.

There is a very wide range of possible circumstances which may lead individuals, in pursuing their self-interest, to deviate from institutionally approved patterns to a greater or less degree. Sometimes in the course of his life-history a far from perfect integration of personality is achieved, and the individual has tendencies of self-interest which conflict with his institutional status and role. Sometimes the social structure itself is poorly integrated so that essentially incompatible things are expected of the same individual. One of the commonest types of this structural malintegration is the case where the symbols of recognition become detached from the institutionally approved achievements, where people receive recognition without the requisite achievements and conversely, those with the achievements to their credit fail of the appropriate recognition. The result of all these various failures of integration is to place the individual in a conflict situation. He is, on the one hand, in conflict with himself. He feels urged to pursue his self-interest in ways which are incompatible with the standards of behaviour in which he himself was brought up and which have been too deeply inculcated for him ever to throw off completely. On the other hand, objectively he is placed in a dilemma. For instance, he may live

jumped directly from economic analysis to ultimate motivations is no longer tenable. The institutional patterns *always* constitute one crucial element of the problem, and the more ultimate problems of motivation can only be approached through an analysis of their role, not by ignoring it.

up to the standards he values and face the loss of recognition and its symbols. Or he may seek external "success" but only by violating his own standards and those of the people he most respects. Usually both internal and external conflicts are involved, and there is no really happy solution.

The usual psychological reaction to such conflict situations is a state of psychological "insecurity." Such a state of insecurity in turn is well known to produce a variety of different more or less "neurotic" reactions by which the individual seeks to solve his conflicts and re-establish his security. One of the commonest of these is an increased aggressiveness in the pursuit of personal ambitions and self-interest generally.

It has been maintained that the institutionalization of self-interest accounts for one very important element of what is usually called the "acquisitiveness" of a capitalistic society. But it is far from accounting for all of it. Ours is a society which in a number of respects is far from being perfectly integrated. A very large proportion of the population is in this sense insecure to an important degree. It is hence suggested that another component of this acquisitiveness, especially of the kind which is most offensive to our moral sentiments, is essentially an expression of this widespread insecurity. Elton Mayo⁷ coined an appropriate phrase for this aspect of the situation when he inverted Tawney's famous title and spoke of the "Acquisitiveness of a Sick Society." But it should be noted that this is an element which, along with the institutionalization of self-interest, is not adequately taken account of by the formula of the "rational pursuit of self-interest."

Many other points could doubtless be raised to show the incompleteness of the above outline of this problem. There is no doubt that in a great many respects its formulation will have to be altered as well as refined as our knowledge of the phenomena accumulates, as is the fate of all scientific conceptual schemes. In addition to whatever merit it may possess as a solution of this particular range of empirical problems, it is important for another reason. So far as it is substantiated it will help to demonstrate that many problems can be more fruitfully attacked by collaboration between the various social disciplines on a theoretical level, than they can by any one of them working alone, no matter how well established its theoretical scheme may be for a certain range of problems.

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⁷In his *Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (New York, 1933). This type of element is probably prominently involved in the widespread complaints about the prevalence of "commercialism" in medicine.

ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND THE MORAL ORDER

THE purpose of this paper is to suggest the close relationship between economic development and movements of moral reform in Canada. From the beginning of Canadian history, organized attempts have been made to control such problems as intemperance, crime, gambling, juvenile delinquency, sexual promiscuity, and prostitution. These movements were indicative of a condition of disintegration of the mores, and their role was that of establishing a new moral code to govern behaviour. But disturbances which resulted in the breakdown of moral standards extended throughout the range of society, and affected the organization of economic and political life as well. Movements of moral reform, like those of an economic or political (or purely religious or cultural) character, were products of economic expansion.

This fact becomes evident if consideration is given to the broad features of the social development of Canada. Beginning with the establishment of the fishing industry in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Canadian development may be represented in terms of a series of stages marked by the emergence of new areas or forms of economic exploitation.¹ The expansion of economic life involved new accommodations in economic, political, and social institutions, and the points of greatest social disturbance were to be found where the impacts of the new techniques of production were most felt. It was within these interstitial areas of social organization, where the traditional culture came in conflict with new economic developments, that movements of reform took their rise.

The first area of social development in Canada in which community life was fully established was the region enclosed within the valley of the St. Lawrence. The rich agricultural resources of this valley, in combination with its intricate set of subsidiary waterways, produced the uneasy accommodation between farming and fur trading which threatened the stability of the society of New France until the control of the fur trade passed into different hands, and the agrarian character of economic development was able to assert itself. The instability of the colonial economy, resulting from the burdens imposed upon it in maintaining the elaborate organization of the fur trade, was reflected in the urgency of economic and political problems which led in the end to the complete

¹See H. A. Innis, "Unused Capacity as a Factor in Canadian Economic History," (*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Feb., 1936, pp. 1-15); F. W. Burton, "Wheat in Canadian History" (*ibid.*, May, 1937, pp. 210-17); S. D. Clark, "Sociology and Canadian Social History" (*ibid.*, Aug. 1939, pp. 348-57). References throughout this paper, whether to general works or documentary material, are inserted to indicate the nature of the sources rather than to provide full documentation.

collapse of New France with the British conquest.² The clash of the fur-trading and agrarian cultures gave rise to social problems of an equally urgent character, of which the brandy trade and the demoralization of the *coureurs de bois* might be considered typical. Efforts of the church to bring these problems under control were rendered largely abortive through the opposition of powerful interests identified with the fur trade. Their successful solution, and the establishment of the control of the church on a firm basis, came only with the breakdown of the French régime and the shift of the control of the fur trade to British-American interests in Montreal.

Colonization of the Maritime region began about the same time as that of the St. Lawrence Valley, but the failure of either France or Britain to establish undisputed sovereignty in this area retarded the development of ordered communal life. The agricultural settlements of Acadian French about the Minas Basin, and the fishing settlements about Louisbourg, were the chief centres of activity before the founding of Halifax in 1749.³ The rapid development of the Maritimes really began with the expulsion of the Acadians and the opening up of the expropriated areas in the 1760's to people from New England. The influx of farmers and fishermen from the New England states was followed by immigration from Scotland, England, northern Ireland, and the European continent, and, after the American Revolution, by the colonization of New Brunswick and new areas of Nova Scotia by United Empire Loyalists.⁴ The disturbances resulting from the development of the fishing industry, agriculture, and trade, were renewed in the closing years of the century with the opening up and exploitation of the timber resources of the St. John and Miramichi River valleys.⁵ In the west, the declining importance of fur-trade interests in Montreal, and the shift of attention to the timber trade of the Ottawa Valley, marked the emergence of a commercial-agrarian society reaching out towards the Great Lakes.⁶ The coming of Loyalist settlers, the waves of American, English, Scottish, and Irish immigration throughout the first half of the next century, and the building of canals and later of railroads, were phases of the expansion of the

²H. A. Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada* (New Haven, 1930).

³H. A. Innis, *The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy* (Toronto, 1940).

⁴J. B. Brebner, *The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia* (New York, 1937); I. F. MacKinnon, *Settlements and Churches in Nova Scotia* (Halifax, 1930).

⁵A. R. M. Lower and H. A. Innis, *Settlement and the Forest and Mining Frontiers* (Toronto, 1936).

⁶D. G. Creighton, *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence* (Toronto and New Haven, 1937).

economy of this area.⁷ In both the Maritimes and Upper Canada, problems of trade and public finance led to movements of an economic and political character in which the demand for greater responsible government played a leading part.⁸ The coming together of people with different cultural backgrounds, and the failure of cultural controls to adapt themselves to the conditions of pioneer farm life, the fishing industry, or the timber trade, gave rise to various social problems such as intemperance, social apathy, gambling, and juvenile delinquency. Religious revivalism and temperance reform were the distinctive forms of social movements during this period.

By the middle of the nineteenth century there were under way economic developments which by the end of the century had not only pushed the area of social life as far west and north as Dawson City but had profoundly affected the character of society in the central and eastern regions. Canal and railway building produced the industrial revolution which gave rise to the industrial city. The urban-industrial civilization, which developed in old-established centres chiefly in the province of Ontario and pushed out steadily to other areas of the country, involved sweeping readjustments in the social attitudes and institutions of the populations caught up in it, and presented problems many of which are still not fully solved. Industrialism did more than create the industrial city. The changes in the organization of community life in the rural hinterland, the opening up of British Columbia and the Yukon, the settlement of the prairies, and the exploitation of the mining and pulp and paper resources of the north, were phases of the general development of industrial capitalism in Canada.⁹ The appearance in the 1870's of such problems as the competition of American manufactured goods, industrial sweating, and depressed prices for farm products, gave rise to protectionist, trade-union, and agrarian movements.¹⁰ Since then, the development of a great number of different kinds of movements is an indication of the increasing complexity of economic and political problems resulting from industrial-capitalism, and of the variety of

⁷Helen I. Cowan, *British Immigration to British North America, 1783-1837* (Toronto, 1928).

⁸W. M. Whitelaw, *The Maritimes and Canada before Confederation* (Toronto, 1934); A. Dunham, *Political Unrest in Upper Canada, 1815-1836* (London, 1927).

⁹A. S. Morton and Chester Martin, *History of Prairie Settlement and Dominion Lands Policy* (Toronto, 1939).

¹⁰S. D. Clark, *The Canadian Manufacturers' Association: A Study in Political Pressure and Collective Bargaining* (Toronto, 1939); H. A. Logan, *The History of Trade-Union Organization in Canada* (Chicago, 1928); "Labour," *Encyclopedia of Canada*, ed. W. S. Wallace, vol. III, pp. 353-64; L. A. Wood, *A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada* (Toronto, 1924).

solutions which have been or are being offered.¹¹ The confusion of moral problems has been no less great, and moral reform has become the province of a bewildering number of movements of which the Salvation Army and the Y.M.C.A. might be considered typical. Although reorganization is still far from complete, the industrialization of older regions has developed to the point where institutional controls are becoming relatively well established. The critical points of disturbance are to be found in those areas, such as the industrial cities of the province of Quebec, where the first impacts of industrial-capitalism are still being felt.¹²

This sketch of Canadian social development serves to emphasize the close relationship between social movements of different kinds, and of those movements to underlying conditions of economic expansion. The opening up of new areas of economic exploitation or the development of new forms of economic production implied considerable geographical and occupational shifts in the population, with effects immediately felt upon the organization of social life. As new areas of population grew up or the population of old areas rapidly increased in numbers, social institutions were faced with the elementary problem of greatly expanding their organization and resources. In addition to this, economic development implied significant changes in the occupational activities and way of living of the great bulk of the population, and very often in its age and sex composition, and this required fundamental adjustments on the cultural level. But such adjustments came about only slowly, and in the early stages of development there existed a condition characterized by a considerable breakdown of traditional cultural controls.

The extent and character of the breakdown, however, depended upon the particular nature of economic development and the physiographic features of the area undergoing development. The geographical and occupational mobility of the population, the distinctiveness of the cultural heritages of ethnic and religious groups, and the kind of demands made upon such cultural institutions as the family, the church, and class structure, varied widely in different areas. Since social problems were specifically related to particular social institutions, their form was determined by the character of these variations. Consequently, the nature of movements thrown up to cope with different social problems can be understood only in terms of the economic and regional demands made upon the culture.

¹¹H. A. Innis, *Problems of Staple Production in Canada* (Toronto, 1933); G. E. Britnell, *The Wheat Economy* (Toronto, 1939).

¹²E. C. Hughes, "Industry and the Rural System in Quebec" (*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Aug., 1938, pp. 341-9).

The mode of production was the dominant factor in determining the geographical and occupational mobility of the population. In farming regions, the small initial returns together with the inherent difficulties of opening up land for cultivation, operated as an effectual check to the influx of people. This was particularly true in the east, where heavy timber had to be cleared from the land, and where there were lacking cheap and rapid facilities of transportation, but even in the western prairies the rate in which people could be absorbed was very definitely limited. As a result, while the movement of population into agricultural frontiers was sufficiently great to give rise to widespread disturbances, it could scarcely be described as spectacular.¹³ Furthermore, an agricultural economy tended to check mobility within the area itself. Once located the pioneer family seldom moved, and this factor hastened considerably the establishment of ordered communal life. To the extent, however, that other forms of production developed on the fringe of agricultural regions, the mobility of population tended to be much greater. While the fur trade of New France attracted a relatively small number of men, those who were engaged in this occupation led a highly nomadic existence. The effects of the timber trade at a later period were somewhat similar. The seasonal nature of the trade gave rise to floating occupational groups which, in the case of New Brunswick, returned to agricultural communities in the summer, and, in the case of the Ottawa Valley, spent their free time in Quebec City.¹⁴ It was in mining communities, however, that the contrast to agricultural regions was the most striking. Placer mining, particularly, provided a field of endeavour in which great numbers of people could immediately participate, and from which returns, occasionally fabulous in size, could be secured without any lengthy period of outlay or preparation. The term "rush" describes without exaggeration the movement of population in 1858-60 into the mining regions of British Columbia, or, in 1898-1900, into the Yukon.¹⁵ Furthermore, the occupation of placer mining was not only seasonal in nature but changed its location at short intervals of time. The effects were evident in the floating character of the mining population, and in the large influx into mining towns during the winter

¹³The system of land granting provided an additional check to rapid settlement. See Norman Macdonald, *Canada, 1763-1841, Immigration and Settlement* (London, 1939); J. B. Hedges, *Building the Canadian West: The Land and Colonization Policies of the Canadian Pacific Railway* (New York, 1939).

¹⁴Lower and Innis, *Settlement and the Forest and Mining Frontiers*; A. R. M. Lower, *The North American Assault on the Canadian Forest* (Toronto, 1938).

¹⁵F. W. Howay, *The Making of a Province* (Toronto, 1928); Lower and Innis, *Settlement and the Forest and Mining Frontiers*; W. N. Sage, *Sir James Douglas and British Columbia* (Toronto, 1930).

season. In the case of urban-industrial centres, the rate of development depended largely upon the state of industrial techniques and organization. Where industries began as small enterprises, as in the case of the early cities of central Canada and the Maritimes, urban growth was not as rapid as where industries began with highly-developed techniques and large capital outlays, as in the case of the industrial cities which have grown up in the last thirty years. The relatively slow development of Toronto during the nineteenth century stands in marked contrast to the phenomenal growth of Drummondville from a sleepy rural village to an industrial city in the present century.¹⁶ Once under way, the very nature of the industrial process meant the mobilization of a labour force from Europe or the rural hinterland, and the concentration of these people in particular centres. It meant, further, an increasing diversity in the nature of occupational activities, and constant shifts of workmen from one industrial centre to another. The urgency and variety of social problems of the modern industrial city is some indication of the mobility and heterogeneity of interests of its population.¹⁷

Similar factors operated to hasten or check the breakdown of cultural differences between ethnic and religious groups in new areas of development. Where sentimental attachments and old-established loyalties were preserved, they tended to check the disintegration of moral standards along certain lines. The urgency and character of social problems, as a result, were closely related to the effects of economic development upon primary group life. The isolated character of settlements in agricultural regions tended to preserve the distinctive cultural heritages of the various immigrant groups. However, the degree of isolation of group settlements depended upon physiographic features of the region, and, in this respect, there were significant contrasts between different areas in Canada which explain the varying rates of cultural assimilation. The topographically enclosed character of the St. Lawrence Valley region had the effect of breaking down cultural differences within the French population. As a result, the diversity in the cultural background of the original colonists has tended to be overlooked in emphasizing the homogeneity which later became established. It is true the population was drawn almost entirely from one country, and comprised few who were not Roman Catholics, but France at this time was far from culturally homogeneous.¹⁸ The breakdown of cultural differences was a product of social life in the Canadian community. In striking contrast to New

¹⁶Hughes, "Industry and the Rural System in Quebec."

¹⁷R. E. L. Faris, "Interrelated Problems of the Expanding Metropolis" (*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Aug., 1939, pp. 341-7).

¹⁸W. A. Riddell, *The Rise of Ecclesiastical Control in Quebec* (New York, 1916).

France, were the settlements in the Maritime region. Colonization here was largely along the seaboard, and the different ports of entry marked off communities from one another. Following the New Englanders, the English, Germans, northern Irish, and Loyalist immigrants pushed farther up the Annapolis Valley, or settled along the south shore or up the St. John Valley, while the Highland Scotch, Newfoundland Irish, and Acadian French were pushed out to the fringes. Lacking means of land transport, and with their economy largely projected outwards towards the sea, these different communities led an almost completely isolated existence. The result was the preservation, for some considerable time, of the distinctive ethnic types of the original population. In Upper Canada and the western prairies, the waves of immigration entering at one or two points had the effect of locating national groups behind one another, reaching back from the first frontiers of settlement. Here, the lines marking off ethnic differences rested for the most part upon the distinction between age of colonization rather than, as in the Maritimes, upon sharp topographical features. The settlements of English people back from the shores of Lake Ontario, the Irish below Ottawa or about the Georgian Bay, or the Ukrainians in the northern parklands of the west, illustrate the character of cultural segregation in these regions.¹⁹ With respect to mining communities, the extreme mobility of the population and its concentration within a small area, prevented any segregation along ethnic or religious lines. Although a very great number of different national and religious groups found their way into such communities, for instance in British Columbia and the Yukon, they failed to acquire, or soon lost, any individuality in the larger population. In the early mining areas of British Columbia the Orientals and negroes, alone, remained distinctive groups.²⁰ For the most part, the same was true in the early urban communities. The industrial-capitalist process had the effect of destroying primary group distinctions and organizing the population along new occupational lines. In the city, however, the diversity of social conditions meant that ethnic groups had a measure of success in maintaining their cultural distinctiveness, though becoming identified with the broader economic process.²¹

The success with which ethnic group distinctions were maintained was closely related to the breakdown or preservation of family controls in new areas of development. Primary group attachments reinforced

¹⁹C. A. Dawson, *Group Settlement: Ethnic Communities in Western Canada* (Toronto, 1936); Robert England, *The Colonization of Western Canada* (London, 1936).

²⁰Matthew MacFie, *Vancouver Island and British Columbia* (London, 1865).

²¹L. G. Reynolds, *The British Immigrant: His Social and Economic Adjustment in Canada* (Toronto, 1935).

the mores upon which the family rested, while the family unit acted as a focus for cultural sentiments. The stability of the family depended very largely upon the demands made by the economy in determining the sex and age composition of the population. In purely agricultural communities, the economic importance of the rural family acted as a check to forces of a disintegrating character. Colonization usually took the form of settlement by families, and the nature of the farm economy and the isolation of the settlers, enhanced the dependence of the individual upon the familial group. It is true that agrarian frontiers attracted numbers of young unattached men, but these for the most part were readily assimilated into the rural society. If they acted as a disturbing influence, the effects were not appreciably felt by the family organization; their vices usually consisted of heavy drinking and petty gambling. The breakdown of family controls in agricultural communities was most evident in problems relating to the conduct of youths growing up in the country. The availability of cheap land or opportunities for work rendered young people largely independent of their parents, while there were few educational or recreational institutions to provide disciplining influences outside the home. The results were evident in the frivolous activities of farm youths, and in the emergence of a social problem which might well be described as one of juvenile delinquency.²² Where occupations which attracted only males developed in close relationship to the agrarian society, family life was seriously threatened. The *coureurs de bois* acted as a disturbing factor in the establishment of normal family life in New France. The free and easy life led by these young men in the woods, where they adopted the habits of the Indian, made them reluctant to accept the responsibilities of marriage. Co-habitation with Indian squaws was common in the fur-trading posts, and not infrequently such sexual irregularities made their appearance within the colony itself. The difficulties experienced by the authorities in attracting females to the colony intensified problems of moral welfare. Some of the women brought in were of questionable character, while girls growing up in the country shared the attitudes of independence of the young men. The *Mandements* of the Bishops of New France emphasize the moral laxity of the female as well as of the male population.²³ In New Brunswick, the development of the timber trade had

²²*Six Years in the Bush; or Extracts from the Journal of a Settler in Upper Canada* (London, 1838), pp. 20-1; Walter Johnstone, *Travels in Prince Edward Island in the Years 1820-21* (Edinburgh, 1823), pp. 87-8; W. Johnstone, *A Series of Letters Descriptive of Prince Edward Island* (Dumfries, 1822), pp. 53-4; J. McGregor, *Historical and Descriptive Sketches of the Maritime Colonies* (London, 1828), p. 73.

²³A. G. Bailey, *The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian Cultures* (Saint John, N.B., 1937); Thwaites (ed.), *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents* (Cleveland, 1900),

similar effects upon family life, although here the problem was not aggravated by contacts with an aboriginal population. The great bulk of those engaged in the timber trade were drawn from agriculture, and considered farming their primary occupation. Such transients, freed from the close control of the rural family during the winter season, and acquiring cash wages which rendered them independent of the farm economy, developed habits of behaviour which threatened the moral as well as the economic welfare of those communities to which they returned in the spring.²⁴ The nature of development in the Ottawa Valley was somewhat different. For the most part, this area was isolated from the agricultural communities lying to the south, and the demoralizing effects of the timber trade, beyond the valley itself, were felt chiefly by the metropolitan centres of Montreal and Quebec City.²⁵ The early mining societies which grew up in British Columbia and the Yukon provided conditions even less favourable to normal family life. In mining regions proper, family life was virtually non-existent, as the population consisted almost entirely of males. In urban centres serving these areas, the large floating male population, particularly during the winter months, provided a constant threat to moral standards. Prostitution which develops under such conditions if a supply of females is available, became a serious problem in Victoria through the close proximity of a demoralized Indian population, and in Skagway and Dawson City through the influx of females attracted by the large returns in free-spending, gold-mining communities.²⁶ The industrial-urban communities provided a great variety of social conditions, with varying effects on family life. To the extent that occupations of the city attracted single males, or the city acted as a metropolis for a hinterland in which males predominated, problems emerged similar in character to those found in mining towns. On the other hand, where the city

vol. LXV, pp. 189-253; *Mandements, Lettres Pastorales et Circulaires des Evêques de Québec* (Quebec, 1887), vol. I, pp. 106-8, 267-70, 300-2, 492-4. A great deal of interesting material bearing upon social conditions in New France is to be found in Public Archives of Canada, *Series C*¹¹ and *Collection Moreau St. Méry*. Space prohibits giving specific references.

²⁴McGregor, *Historical and Descriptive Sketches*, pp. 167-8; George Patterson, *Memoir of the Rev. James MacGregor* (Philadelphia, 1859), pp. 317-19, 369-70.

²⁵R. H. Bonnycastle, *The Canadas in 1841* (London, 1841), vol. I, pp. 95-6; J. S. Buckingham, *Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick* (London, 1843), p. 231.

²⁶Reports of Grand Jury, *Daily British Colonist* (Victoria, 1859-62); MacFie, *Vancouver Island and British Columbia*, pp. 65-76; D. G. F. Macdonald, *British Columbia and Vancouver Island* (London, 1862), pp. 328-30; Public Archives of Canada, *S.P.G. in F.P., 1860-67*, various reports; S. Tollemache, *Reminiscences of the Yukon* (Toronto, 1912), pp. 4-5, 53-4; M. A. D. Armstrong, *Yukon Yesterdays* (London, 1936), pp. 47-59.

was little more than an expansion of the agricultural town, mores of the family tended to persist if somewhat modified. The rural or peasant background of much of the urban population checked the breakdown of traditional moral standards, but, in turn, retarded the necessary adjustments to urban conditions with effects particularly evident among the second generation. The emergence of such problems as juvenile delinquency, illegitimacy, prostitution, and family desertion, was an indication of failure to maintain family controls in the urban community, and this failure was most evident in those transitional areas of the city where the demands of urban life pressed most heavily upon the population.²⁷

In turning to religious controls, the effect of economic development is likewise evident. Religious denominations tended to act as a conservative force in face of rapid social change. In promoting the good, they were preserving the traditional. Thus, apart from financial considerations, their interests tended to become identified with the economically sheltered groups in the community. But the effectiveness of their influence depended upon their ability to meet the needs of those occupational groups thrown up by new economic developments, and this involved far-reaching adjustments in their organization and teachings. The failure to make those adjustments explains the weakening of religious controls in new areas of development.

In New France, the slowness with which the Catholic Church adapted its organization and teaching to the needs of a population scattered along the banks of the St. Lawrence or engaged in the fur trade resulted in a considerable weakening of its influence. The *coueurs de bois* adopted many of the attitudes of superstition of the North American Indian, and lost respect for traditional religious practices and beliefs. The nature of their activities placed them in sharp conflict with the Jesuit missionaries. The effects of the fur trade, and of contacts with the Indian, extended throughout the colony. Many of the inhabitants became careless in the exercise of their religious duties, and tended to disregard the moral teachings of the priests. The difficulties encountered by the church in the collection of tithes, or in the enforcement of its decrees prohibiting the trade in brandy, were indications of the breakdown of its controls. Those difficulties were enhanced by the strained relationships between the ecclesiastical and governmental authorities.

²⁷Faris, "Interrelated Problems of the Expanding Metropolis." For early references to the problem of prostitution in Canadian urban communities, see Public Archives of Canada, *Upper Canada Sundries*, W. L. McKenzie to Secretary of the Lieutenant-Governor, Nov. 23, 1834; Robert Everest, *A Journey through the United States and Part of Canada* (London, 1855), p. 5.

The population, however, was virtually all Catholic, and this monopoly of religious teaching effectively prevented defections within the ranks of the church. Though the inhabitants disobeyed many of the ecclesiastical decrees, they did not lose the fear of the power of excommunication. Protest took the form of challenging the exercise of this power in particular circumstances rather than of questioning the authority to exercise it. The effect was to preserve the form if not the substance of the Catholic faith. Consequently, the revival of religious feeling, particularly after the collapse of the French régime, operated within the organization of the church. The breaking off of cultural connections with France left Catholicism as the only unifying influence among the Canadian population. By establishing friendly relationships with the governing group, the church was able to achieve a position of dominance in the new British colony.²⁸

In the Maritimes and Upper Canada, the established religious denominations were on the whole less successful in adjusting themselves. The Presbyterian and Catholic churches were striking exceptions, partly because of the character of their followers and partly because of the close doctrinal system and organization they had built up. If Presbyterianism was more successful in Canada than in the western American states in resisting revivalist movements, the reason may be found in the dominant Scottish character of Canadian Presbyterian congregations. Where the Scottish influence was weak, as in the American settlements near the border, revivalism made considerable headway among Presbyterians. Scottish immigrants brought with them to Nova Scotia and Upper Canada a form of society largely feudal in character in which the church was the dominant organization. The strong ethnocentrism of their group life effectively resisted forces of disintegration in the colonial society. The strict moral codes of the Scotch in Pictou stands in marked contrast to the general breakdown of moral standards in many of the other early pioneer communities of Nova Scotia.²⁹ Similar factors operated to strengthen the position of Catholicism. The strength of the Catholic Church, in the Maritimes and Upper Canada, lay among the Highland Scotch, the Acadian French, and the southern Irish.

²⁸Bailey, *The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian Cultures*; Mack Eastman, *Church and State in Early Canada* (Edinburgh, 1915); *Mandements, Lettres Pastorales et Circulaires des Evêques de Québec*, vol. I; Public Archives of Canada, *Series C¹¹*, particularly correspondence of Frontenac; Riddell, *The Rise of Ecclesiastical Control in Quebec*.

²⁹Patterson, *Memoir of the Rev. James MacGregor*; A. L. Spedon, *Rambles Among the Blue-Noses* (Montreal, 1863), pp. 197-8; Diary of the Rev. William Proudfoot in *Transactions of the London and Middlesex Historical Society*, 1915, 1917, 1922, and *Records of the Ontario Historical Society*, 1931, 1933, 1934, 1936; William Gregg, *History of the Presbyterian Church in Canada* (Toronto, 1885).

Catholicism was an integral part of the clan organization of the Highland Scotch, and occupied a position very similar to that of Scottish Presbyterianism. While lacking the clan organization, the society of the Acadian French was also largely feudal in character. Isolated from the more progressive settlements in the Maritimes, the Acadians were completely dependent upon the cultural leadership of the church. The priest acted as judge, teacher, and pastor, and the whole organization of the community was built up around him. Like French Canada, as a result, the church was able to maintain a dominant position.³⁰ Among the Irish of Upper Canada the Catholic Church was placed in a weaker position, but here the militant opposition of Protestant groups strengthened the Catholic faith. Irish Catholicism, however, was not unaffected by the evangelical movements which swept across the country.

Though closely related to Presbyterianism in doctrines and practice, the Congregational Church was much less successful in establishing itself in British North America. Congregationalism was brought to Nova Scotia just at the time when, because of the increasing formalism of its services and teachings, it was meeting the vigorous challenge of the Evangelical Awakening in New England. It never secured a position of influence in its new homeland, and, with its loyalty questioned after the outbreak of revolution in the American colonies, it rapidly disintegrated in face of the revivalist movement led by Henry Alline.³¹ Most of the Congregationalists turned to the Presbyterian or Baptist faiths.

If the Congregational Church failed to establish successfully its claim of loyalty to the empire, the Anglican Church suffered rather because of a too great dependence upon the colonial connection. The establishment of the church was promoted by governmental authorities as a means of strengthening the bonds of empire and of discouraging movements of a republican or democratic character.³² This tie with officialdom weakened the church as a religious institution. The establishment implied not only an acceptance of, but a dependence upon, a system of privileges, and, to preserve these, the ecclesiastical authorities became deeply involved in colonial politics. The personnel and organization of the church emphasized its dependence upon the governing minority.

³⁰W. S. Moorsom, *Letters From Nova Scotia* (London, 1830), pp. 256-60.

³¹E. M. Saunders, *History of the Baptists of the Maritime Provinces* (Halifax, 1902); *The Life and Journal of the Rev. Henry Alline* (Boston, 1806).

³²Public Archives of Canada, *N.S.A.*, vol. 83, July 11, 1768, Franklin to Secretary of State; *Ibid.*, vol. 89, Oct. 23, 1773, Legge to Secretary of State; *Ibid.*, vol. 133, July 27, 1801, Wentworth to Secretary of State; Public Archives of Canada, *S.P.G.*, B25, 1760-86, Oct. 23, 1767, the Rev. J. Breyton to Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.

It first established itself in the larger towns where official and military groups were unduly important. Its ministers were recruited from English universities, and thus tended to associate themselves with the socially superior classes. The formal nature of the church service was jealously preserved because of its appeal to the polite members of the society, while the Oxford accent and learned expositions of the minister in his pulpit provided adequate assurance of the intellectual worth of the sermon. Lacking an understanding of the problems of a pioneer farm population, the Anglican clergymen were unable either in the pulpit or in pastoral visiting to meet the rural parishioners on a common footing.³³ A reading of their reports to the secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel leaves the impression that many of these missionaries after many years in the field were still living among people whom they neither understood nor sympathized with. Furthermore, the personal qualities of these clergymen were not always the highest. The most able recruits to the ministry preferred to stay in England, and those sent to the colonies often had attributes which unfitted them for clerical duties at home. An inclination to hug the comforts of their town parsonages rather than venture out to distant and isolated rural communities, an undue interest in the remuneration provided by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, and a tendency to fall into careless, and at times even immoral, habits of behaviour, were traits of a large number of the early Anglican clergymen, particularly in Nova Scotia.³⁴ The system of fixed curacies meant that those communities which were unfortunate in the character of the missionary sent to them were left for years without an able clergyman to minister to their religious needs.

The weakness of the Anglican Church was reflected in the disappearance of devout or reverent attitudes on the part of many of the inhabitants of the Maritimes and Upper Canada. The conditions of pioneer farm life in these areas were probably unfavourable to the growth of a religious feeling, particularly among male members of the population, but even where the sentiment prevailed, the lack of any church to attend, or the rigid formality of the Anglican service, discouraged the exercise of religious duties.³⁵ The results were evident in the general lowering

³³Bishop Inglis in Nova Scotia was constantly writing to England urging the necessity of sending clergymen more suited to colonial conditions, Public Archives of Canada, *The Correspondence of Bishop Inglis*. See also Robert Gourlay, *Statistical Account of Upper Canada* (London, 1822), vol. I, pp. 432-3; J. J. Bigsby, *The Shoe and Canoe or Pictures of Travel in the Canadas* (London, 1850), vol. I, pp. 28, 343-5.

³⁴Public Archives of Canada, *Correspondence of Bishop Inglis*; S.P.G., B25, 1760-86.

³⁵Patterson, *Memoir of the Rev. James MacGregor*, pp. 95-9, 104, 123-6, 317-19, 350-1, 369-70; W. Bell, *Hints to Emigrants* (Edinburgh, 1824), pp. 89, 103-4; J. B. Brown,

of the cultural and moral tone of the pioneer society. An inclination to over-indulge in intoxicating beverages, to pass the time in frivolous activities, and to fall into careless and apathetic habits of behaviour, were characteristics attributed to many of the inhabitants by outside observers.³⁶ There was lacking that moral drive, ordinarily provided by a religious ethic and the prestige of a social *élite*, which brings a striving for material and cultural betterment. Yet the reality of the needs which were not being met by the Church of England was made evident by the rise and rapid spread of religious revivalist movements. Beginning during the period of the American revolutionary war with Henry Alline's Newlight movement in the western parts of the province of Nova Scotia, the spirit of religious revival spread over the Maritime region in the course of the next thirty years. The Baptists, drawing their inspiration from the Great Awakening in the western American states, were chiefly successful in those sections settled largely by people from New England who had been attached to the Congregational Church, while the Methodists, relying upon Wesleyan missionaries from England, scored their greatest gains in communities made up of immigrants from Britain.³⁷ In Upper Canada, religious evangelism was brought in by itinerant preachers from the United States, and here the Episcopal Methodists became the dominant religious sect, although their position was later seriously challenged by Wesleyan missionaries from England.³⁸

Views of Canada and the Colonists (Edinburgh, 1844), pp. 243-4; E. A. Talbot, *Five Years Residence in the Canadas* (London, 1824), vol. II, p. 125; John Howison, *Sketches of Upper Canada* (Edinburgh, 1825), pp. 157-8; John M'Donald, *Narrative of a Voyage to Quebec, and a Journey from thence to New Lanarck* (London, 1826), p. 25; *Claims of the Churchmen and Dissenters of Upper Canada Brought to the Test* (Kingston, 1828).

³⁶Susanna Moodie, *Life in the Clearings versus the Bush* (London, 1853), pp. 63-4; Anna Jameson, *Winter Studies and Summer Rambles* (Toronto, 1923), pp. 40-1; Howison, *Sketches of Upper Canada*, pp. 151-2, 184-91, 225; Talbot, *Five Years Residence*, vol. II, pp. 57-8. See M. A. Garland and J. J. Talman, "Pioneer Drinking Habits, and the Rise of the Temperance Agitation in Upper Canada" (*Papers and Records of the Ontario Historical Society*, vol. XXVII, p. 345).

³⁷*The Life and Journal of the Rev. Henry Alline*; Public Archives of Canada, S.P.G., B25, 1760-86; J. Davis, *Life and Times of the Rev. Harris Harding* (Charlottetown, 1866); Matthew Richey, *A Memoir of the Late Rev. William Black, Wesleyan Minister* (Halifax, 1839); Joshua Marsden, *The Narrative of a Mission to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the Somers Islands* (London, 1827); Saunders, *History of the Baptists of the Maritime Provinces*; T. Watson Smith, *History of the Methodist Church of Eastern British America* (Halifax, 1877), 2 vols. For an account of the Evangelical Awakening in the United States see C. C. Cleaveland, *The Great Revival in the West, 1797-1805* (Chicago, 1916).

³⁸John Carroll, *Case and His Contemporaries* (Toronto, 1867-), 5 vols.; G. F. Playter, *History of Methodism in Canada* (Toronto, 1862); *The Life and Times of the Rev. Anson Green, Written by Himself* (Toronto, 1877); C. B. Sissons, *Egerton Ryerson, His Life and Letters* (Toronto, 1937).

The Anglican Church lost heavily in face of the evangelical revival. It is true large numbers of people in both the Maritimes and Upper Canada had been nonconformist before settling in the country, and the spirit of revivalism made greatest headway among this section of the population, but many Anglicans passed over to the new religious sects. The personal qualities of the evangelical preachers gave them an advantage over the better-trained and better-paid Anglican clergymen in appealing for popular support. Their humble background, their simple but powerful faith, their capacity to preach in a manner pleasing to a pioneer population, their willingness to undertake difficult journeys into the most isolated sections of the country, and their indifference to pecuniary reward, were some of the qualities which account for their success. Furthermore, the organization of the sects was excellently adapted to the conditions of a frontier society. The itinerant character of the ministry, the organization of the laity into local classes, the practice of holding religious services wherever people could be brought together, and the periodical camp meetings, provided a flexibility in organization which was conspicuously lacking in the Church of England.³⁹ The phenomenal growth of these movements, it is true, had disturbing effects upon pioneer society and upon the lives of many of the pioneer inhabitants. Work was neglected when camp meetings were in progress, while many of the female members of the population abandoned themselves completely to the cause of religion; a superintendent of a mental hospital claimed that religious emotionalism was responsible for the mental breakdown of many of his patients.⁴⁰ On the other hand, the evangelical awakening undoubtedly contributed to the moral regeneration of pioneer society. The spread of a belief in temperance, a quickening of the cultural life of farm communities, and a strengthening of religious sentiments, followed in the wake of revivals.⁴¹ The effects extended far beyond the purely religious or moral realm. Religious revivalism was an expression of social dissatisfaction with an order of

³⁹C. Churchill, *Memorials of a Missionary Life in Nova Scotia* (London, 1845), pp. 68-9, 74-82; C. Stuart, *The Emigrants' Guide to Upper Canada* (London, 1820), pp. 110-14; Jameson, *Winter Studies and Summer Rambles*, pp. 183-4; T. W. Magrath, *Authentic Letters from Upper Canada*, ed. by T. Radcliffe (Dublin, 1833), pp. 190-205; *Thoughts on the Present State and Future Prospects of the Church of England in Canada* (1836), pp. 3-5; Henry Taylor, *Journal of a Tour from Montreal to the Eastern Townships* (Quebec, 1840), pp. 35-6; Egerton Ryerson, *Wesleyan Methodism in Canada* (Toronto, 1837), pp. 9-14; W. J. D. Waddilove (ed.), *The Stewart Missions* (London, 1838), *passim*.

⁴⁰*Preliminary Report of the Board of Inspectors of Asylums, Prisons, &c.* (Quebec, 1860), p. 50, Canada, Sessional Papers, 1860, no. 32.

⁴¹Carroll, *Case and His Contemporaries*, vol. I, pp. 181-6; Playter, *History of Methodism in Canada*, pp. 158-63.

privileges established in the colonies; it provided, at a time when secular means of communication were still largely ineffective, the only means of outlet for those democratic feelings being generated on the frontier.⁴² The fact that the protest was religious in character increased rather than lessened its social significance. The needs of the pioneer were formulated in the vocabulary of the Bible, and found expression in a social philosophy couched largely in religious terms.

The evangelical revivalist movements met effectively the needs of a pioneer agrarian society. With industrial expansion in the latter half of the nineteenth century, religious denominations faced the problem of making new kinds of adjustments. The high degree of competition between the different organizations introduced a note of flexibility which had been lacking in the case of the Anglican Church at the beginning of the century. The undertaking by the various churches in central Canada of missionary activities in British Columbia after the first influx of population into the mining areas, the prosecution of a vigorous policy of church building throughout the western prairies, and the elaboration of social agencies of various sorts in the urban community, demonstrated the effect of denominational competition.⁴³ The churches, however, were not wholly successful in meeting the new kinds of needs which developed in an urban-industrial civilization. There is little evidence that missionaries sent to mining communities had much influence, while, in the urban community, the adjustments made by religious denominations, until recently at any rate, were more apparent than real. The fact that Canadian cities inherited a culture largely agrarian in its origin enabled the churches to maintain an appearance of strength. But many of their most faithful followers were people who had migrated from rural areas to the city. Those needs of an essentially urban character were inadequately met by the churches. The failure to develop a social philosophy offering any solution to the pressing problems of industrial workers had the effect of lessening the dependence of this section of the population upon religious leadership. Even more, the philosophical and psychological assumptions underlying the currently-accepted religions rendered the churches unable to deal with such peculiarly urban problems as the slum, crime, and prostitution. Respectability was a condition of membership in the church, and respectability was maintained

⁴²G. W. Brown, "The Early Methodist Church and the Canadian Point of View" (*Report of the Canadian Historical Association*, 1938).

⁴³C. C. McLaurin, *Pioneering in Western Canada: A Story of the Baptists* (1939); E. H. Oliver, *The Winning of the Frontier* (Toronto, 1930); James Woodsworth, *Thirty Years in the Canadian North-West* (Toronto, 1917); Public Archives of Canada, *S.P.G. in F.P., Canada, 1860-7*.

by ignoring undesirable characters of the population. The puritan taboos of Protestantism, particularly, prohibited any recognition of the fact that such people as slum dwellers, criminals, or prostitutes existed in the community. The established religious denominations only tardily adapted their organization and teachings to the needs of the economically and socially marginal groups thrown up by industrial-capitalism, and this failure was emphasized by the weakening of religious controls in urban centres and by the rise of new movements of an evangelical character. The necessity of developing realistic and sympathetic techniques of dealing with the slum dweller, criminal, or prostitute, was demonstrated by the conspicuous success achieved by the Salvation Army. The rapid growth of this movement, after its organization in London, Ontario, in 1882, paralleled the successes of the Methodist and Baptist revivalist sects in the early part of the century. By 1900, the Army had made serious inroads into the followings of the established denominations, and, in the course of the next two decades, it had securely established its position of leadership among the large lower strata of the urban population.

The problems encountered by the churches in adjusting themselves to new social conditions suggest the close relationship between religious controls and the class structure. Forces which weakened the influence of religious denominations resulted in the breakdown of the leadership of the privileged classes in the community. The occupational groups thrown up by new economic developments emphasized interests which could not be served within the traditional class structure. The privileged classes were the bearers of tradition because it was in tradition that their privileges were secured. The very fact of economic development implied the emergence of forms of behaviour which ran counter to traditionalism. The fur trade, pioneer farming, fishing, the timber trade, mining, and industrial labour, for instance, were rational rather than traditional activities in that they involved an appraisal of the relation of means to the desired ends. The application of new techniques necessarily meant a break from traditional modes of behaviour. The effect was to weaken the leadership of the socially superior classes.

In New France, the character of the *noblesse* prevented its members from sharing in the dominant interests of the colony. Lacking the resources or inclination to adapt themselves to a society in which trade paved the way to economic and social leadership, they lost that prestige which was essential if they were to act as a stabilizing influence in the community. The participation of many of the sons of seigniors in the fur trade, to the extent of becoming *coureurs de bois*, was indicative of the disintegration of the class structure rather than of its adjustment to

the conditions of a fur-trade-agrarian society. The *gentilshommes* who clung to their prerogatives of class often became objects of charity from the state.⁴⁴ In the rural society of the Maritimes and Upper Canada, the large influx of settlers who were unfavourably disposed towards the idea of an upper class, in combination with the fact that the possession of hereditary prerogatives, education, or capital provided little if any advantage in achieving success in agriculture, effectively destroyed distinctions making for the establishment of a rural aristocracy. Where the Scottish clan organization was maintained as in the Talbot settlement, or where the isolation of communities preserved inherited cultural values as in the English settlements north of Peterborough, vestiges of a class system tended to persist in the rural culture.⁴⁵ For the most part, however, the upper classes became closed urban groups made up of government officials, officers of the army and (in Halifax) of the navy, and members of the new merchant class. Their interests and way of life sharply divorced them from the pioneer rural society, and they lost, as a result, the character of a true social *élite*.⁴⁶ In the later industrial-capitalist society, the disintegration of traditional class values extended even further. The dominant occupational types created by industrialism, notably the factory worker and miner, represented a sharper break from tradition than the types resulting from any previous economic development. In the early society of British Columbia, the wide gulf between the members of the small socially superior class in Victoria City who thought in the traditional terms of the fur trade and the great masses engaged in mining activities is illustrative of a condition extending throughout early industrial-capitalist society.⁴⁷ Processes of industrial production resulted in a very considerable rationalization

⁴⁴W. B. Munro, *The Seigniorial System in Canada* (New York, 1907); Public Archives of Canada, *Series C11*; Francis Parkman, *The Old Régime in Canada* (Boston, 1909); Public Archives of Canada, *Series Q*, vol. 85, Lt. Gov. Milnes to Duke of Portland, Nov. 1, 1800.

⁴⁵Moorsom, *Letters from Nova Scotia*, pp. 280-1; Talbot, *Five Years Residence*, vol. II, pp. 9-11; Howison, *Sketches of Upper Canada*, pp. 188-90; Bell, *Hints to Emigrants*, pp. 144-5; Moodie, *Life in the Clearings*, pp. xii-xiii; C. P. Traill, *The Backwoods of Canada* (London, 1836), pp. 101-2, 268-72; *Six Years in the Bush; or Extracts from the Journal of a Settler in Upper Canada, 1832-1838*, pp. 16-17; James Taylor, *Narrative of a Voyage to, and Travels in Upper Canada* (London, 1850), vol. I, pp. 130-1.

⁴⁶W. O. Raymond (ed.), *Winslow Papers* (Saint John, N.B., 1901), p. 288; A. Gesner, *New Brunswick* (London, 1847), pp. 161, 322, 328-9; *The Englishwoman in America* (London, 1856), p. 44; Jameson, *Winter Studies and Summer Rambles*, pp. 50-1; T. R. Preston, *Three Years Residence in Canada* (London, 1840), vol. II, pp. 46-8; Bonnycastle, *The Canadas in 1841*, vol. I, pp. 168-70.

⁴⁷Files of the *Daily British Colonist*, Victoria.

of social groupings, and the loss on the part of the great mass of industrial populations of any deep respect for the traditionally upper classes.

The effects of this breakdown of the leadership of the social *élite* extended into the province of moral conduct. The moral code was the expression of the traditional norms of respectability. In other words, it rested very largely upon values inherent in the class structure. Disturbances which upset the value-systems of the socio-economic order led to the disintegration of ethical standards. In a sense, this disintegration meant a breakdown of folk culture and the emergence of mass behaviour. The former implied control in terms of tradition, group loyalty, and sentimental attachments, the latter in terms of a rational interpretation of the relationship of means to ends lying within the range of experience of the individual. The reliance upon such controls usually meant a relaxation of standards and a freer expression of immediately felt wants. Prestige and respectability acted only slightly as forces inhibiting behaviour. Thus in New France it was the *coureur de bois*, in the Maritimes and Upper Canada, the lumberman, fisherman, and backwoods farmer, and in the recently industrialized society the transient worker who challenged most vigorously the accepted codes of behaviour. The person on the margin of economic life was also marginal in a cultural sense. In other words, cultural change entered at that point of greatest economic disturbance, and among those people most affected by the disturbance.

This fact secures emphasis if attention is directed to the character of those people who sought to bring about reform. Both the early leaders and followers of moral reform movements tended to be people who had few claims to respectability, if respectability is taken to mean acceptance within the socially approved circles of society. The very nature of their role implied that the leaders of these movements were not accepted within such circles. They challenged the authority of established institutions, and thereby lost any claim to "official" recognition. Ordinarily, they were lacking in learning. Henry Alline, for instance, was acutely aware of his few educational attainments, and for a time hesitated for this reason to embark on a career of preaching, but the conviction that the call would not have been delivered if an education had been required in the eyes of God, persuaded him to disregard traditional standards and face the opposition of the denominational churches.⁴⁸ Most of the other early preachers of the evangelical sects were similarly lacking in educational qualifications.⁴⁹ In Nova Scotia,

⁴⁸*The Life and Journal of the Rev. Henry Alline*, pp. 36-46.

⁴⁹Public Archives of Canada, *Correspondence of Bishop Inglis*; Saunders, *History of the Baptists*, pp. 112-13, 176, 184-5; William Scott, *Letters on Superior Education* (1860), pp. 44-5.

it was the educational work of the Presbyterians which led the Baptist Church to recognize the value of training its ministers; with respect to Methodism in Upper Canada, the Ryersons significantly mark the change from an attitude of indifference to education to one of appreciation. Likewise, most of the early leaders of new movements belonged to that class in the community which eked out a precarious economic livelihood. A large number of the Methodist preachers who carried the gospel into Upper Canada spent their boyhood days on rocky farms in the New England states.⁵⁰ The two men who organized the first Salvation Army in Canada were humble workmen from England. The fact that such people became leaders of social movements in the community did not imply their ascendancy in the social scale, and herein they differed from those "successful" men who rose from a humble station in life. The prophet sought the moral welfare of the ordinary folk among whom he lived.

Similarly, the early followers of these movements were, for the most part, the economically insecure members of the community, although wealth was often attained after joining the movement. The evangelical awakening in the Maritimes and Upper Canada, for instance, drew support particularly from farmers and fishermen. Indeed, the degree of evangelical fervour of the different revivalist movements was closely related to the degree of respectability of their recruits. In Nova Scotia the Baptists had greater success than the Methodists in appealing to the poverty-stricken and negro populations, and this success was not unrelated to the fanatical character of their teachings. Neither the Methodists nor the Baptists, so long as they remained evangelical sects, drew any appreciable support from the wealthier classes in the community.⁵¹ While the followers of these movements were fairly sharply marked off from those of the Church of England on class lines, the distinction between them and Presbyterian or Catholic sections of the population was of a different sort. The latter retained status within their closely integrated ethnic or religious communities; the early Baptists or Methodists were more often the nondescript, foot-loose members of society. The same characteristics occur among the followers of temperance movements at this time. The Anglican and Presbyterian churches, and members of the privileged classes generally, either remained indifferent to temperance reform or vigorously attacked it. Temperance leaders recruited their followers from much the same sections of society as the Methodists and Baptists.⁵² With respect to

⁵⁰Carroll, *Case and His Contemporaries*, vol. I.

⁵¹Saunders, *History of the Baptists*, p. 116; Marsden, *Narrative of a Mission*, p. 188.

⁵²Gesner, *New Brunswick*, p. 327; Buckingham, *Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick*, p. 26; Bonnycastle, *The Canadas in 1841*, vol. I, pp. 128-9.

the Salvation Army in the latter part of the century, social lines were even more strictly drawn. Support came from those people who had lost, or failed to attain, status in the rapidly expanding urban society. For some considerable time, vigorous opposition was faced from the more respectable members of the community.

The rise of reform movements indicated the failure of the traditionally superior classes to provide leadership for large masses of the population, and the emergence of new leadership within these sections of society. The leaders of moral reform movements challenged the prerogatives and prestige of the recognized members of the *élite*; they became, in a sense, a new social *élite*. This is seen very clearly in the case of Methodism in the last century. Early Methodist preachers, though lacking attributes of respectability, were popular leaders in the pioneer society. Their successors, represented by such people as Egerton Ryerson, were able to achieve a position of respectability and prestige. The shift indicated more than the aging of the Methodist movement; it implied a fundamental change in the character of the class structure. The social movement brought about the transition to a new social equilibrium in which cultural leadership was adjusted to the new demands of an expanding society.

Enough has been said to indicate, if not fully to demonstrate, the close relationship of social problems and social reform movements to underlying conditions of economic production. The breakdown of the traditional cultural controls of ethnic groups, the family, religion, and social classes, resulted from a condition of economic expansion. But all forms of economic expansion did not affect cultural controls in the same way. The institutions and social values which broke down were those not adapted to the particular conditions of economic production, and the breakdown was most drastic among those sections of the population most exposed to these conditions. Thus, to define social disorganization as the "decrease of the influence of existing social rules of behaviour upon individual members of the group"⁵³ leaves unanswered the question of what rules are decreasing in influence and among what members of the group. The significance of this question is emphasized in the present discussion. Different kinds of technological development had different effects upon social institutions, and even the same technological development did not affect equally all sections of the population. The industrial process, for instance, involved adjustments very different from those of agriculture, and involved varying degrees of adjustment within the same population.

⁵³W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (Boston, 1920), vol. IV, p. 2.

This close relationship of cultural controls to the dominant mode of production suggests the need for caution in formulating any composite index of social disorganization. Indices of divorce rates, family desertion, juvenile delinquency, and vice may indicate the existence of a condition of social disorganization in certain areas of the city, but they would throw little light upon the state of organization of a rural, or even mining, society. If crime, juvenile delinquency, and vice were problems peculiar to the growing city, intemperance and social apathy were problems more peculiar to pioneer agricultural communities. Thus the efforts of the Catholic Church in New France to prohibit the brandy trade and check the lawless behaviour of the *coureurs de bois*, of religious and temperance movements in the early nineteenth century to put a stop to heavy drinking and raise the moral level of pioneer societies, and of such organizations as the Salvation Army, in the expanding urban community, to cope with problems of crime, prostitution, and slums, indicate the different sorts of social disorganization which emerge in different areas of development. This paper has sought to point out some of the dominant economic factors determining the particular nature of social problems and of the social movements which grew up to bring them under control.

A full explanation of these problems and social movements, however, would require a consideration of forces of political, as well as economic, development in Canada. If the Canadian fur-trade, agricultural, or mining frontiers, or Canadian urban communities, have not followed the same pattern of development as similar regions in the United States, the reason is to be found in the distinctive character of political institutions in Canada. The Canadian frontier never became an unrestricted area of economic development; it always assumed considerable strategical importance in the political and military organization of the northern half of the continent. The army, in Canada, pushed out with the frontiersmen. In New France, the elaborate military organization built up to support the fur trade emphasized the strategical importance of the western domain to the colony on the banks of the St. Lawrence.⁶⁴ The *coureurs de bois*, the Jesuit Order, and the army penetrated side by side the interior of the continent. Political considerations were even more important in the development of the Maritime region. Halifax was founded to offset the military strength of Louisbourg; the navy and army have continued throughout as dominant institutions in the social development of this area. In Upper Canada, political forces have tended to be overlooked in emphasizing the dominant economic forces of the agricultural frontier. The maintenance of an army in larger centres,

⁶⁴Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada*.

the system of land granting, and the close tie between church and state were indicative of the strategic military importance of this area to the empire. Though the drive of metropolitan commercial interests was partly responsible for the confederation of the eastern provinces, the necessity of erecting a stronger military unit as a defence against the United States was also a primary consideration.⁵⁵ In the west, the contrast with the American frontier was even more marked. The development of the western fur trade, the opening up of the mining regions in British Columbia, and the early settlement of Manitoba, took place under the strict control of the Hudson's Bay Company. The avoidance of any serious clash between the frontiersmen and the Indians, and the successful maintenance of law and order in British Columbia in contrast with California, are explained largely in terms of the strength of imperial interests represented by the Hudson's Bay Company. How effective this control had been was demonstrated with the outbreak of lawlessness in southern Alberta during the brief interregnum after 1870 when sovereignty was being transferred to the Canadian Government.⁵⁶ The organization of the North West Mounted Police in 1874, and the successful establishment of law and order in Alberta, set the pattern for later development in the Canadian west, interrupted only by the North West Rebellion. The members of the mounted police force followed closely upon the heels of the first mining prospectors into the Yukon, and the settlers on the prairies seldom passed far beyond the reach of mounted police patrols.

The restraining influences exerted by the close imperial connection, and by the presence to the south of a powerful and rapidly expanding republic, introduced certain distinctive features in the social development of Canada. As a result, generalizations drawn from investigations of community life in the United States have only a qualified reference when applied to the Canadian scene. Forces of geography combined with those of politics to restrict the operation of free enterprise on the frontier. Economic controls imposed by the state have been paralleled by controls making for rigidities in cultural development. However it has not been the object of this paper to estimate the importance of such influences. The general lines of social development in Canada have been determined by forces of economic expansion; forces of a political nature enter in as qualifying factors.

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⁵⁵Chester Martin, "British Policy in Canadian Confederation" (*Canadian Historical Review*, March, 1932, pp. 3-19).

⁵⁶C. M. MacInnes, *In the Shadow of the Rockies* (London, 1930).

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